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## The Five-Year Plan and the Anti-Soviet Front

**A** NUMBER of essentially new factors have entered into the inter-relationships between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world at the present time, and these factors ought to be seriously reckoned with by the Communist Parties. The second year of successful realisation of the five-year plan of socialist construction coincides with an undoubtedly worsening of the economic situation in world economy. The capitalist heaven is being heavily overcast with the clouds of an economic crisis. In the U.S.A. there is a stock exchange catastrophe and an economic depression. In the European countries serious economic difficulties are everywhere observable. In Britain the unemployment problem and the fate of the coal industry are the two most severe problems of the day. The plans proposed by the MacDonald Government do not satisfy large-scale capital, despite the fact that the Labourists are simultaneously meeting a number of the bourgeoisie's other desires—in particular they have shamefully betrayed the hopes of the unem-

ployed. In Germany a severe crisis is raging in the State and municipal finances and completely occupying the country's attention, whilst in the important economic journals the signals of an industrial oppression are appearing. In Poland all spheres of industry except perhaps that of coal are passing through a serious depression and crisis of distribution, accompanied by a general crisis in Polish national economy. In Czechoslovakia also there are profound economic difficulties such as this little country with its highly developed industry has not known for years.

This extreme disturbance of capitalist stabilisation is determining the political situation now evolving. Even if the open indicators of the increasingly worsening economic situation did not exist, on the basis of the political events one could still have said that there is not a trace of the far-famed stabilisation in capitalist countries. Only recently France emerged from a government crisis; in Britain the Labour Government is continually experiencing fresh blows from the opposition; the House of Lords has already

more than once turned down government proposals, and in the Commons a very tense atmosphere has been created in connection with the Coal Mines Bill. In Germany the Government has been forced to demand a vote of confidence, and in the discussion in the Reichstag it was revealed that the Government did not possess a stable majority and that "parliamentary democracy" had been shattered, ignored by the real dictators of Germany—the large finance and industrial barons with Schacht, the president of the Reichsbank, at their head. In Poland, despite the obvious desire of the Pilsudskyites to adopt a "hard hand" policy, and despite the complete readiness of the "opposition" in the Seym to execute the demand of fascism, the question of the formation of a Government has been protracted owing to objective economic causes depriving a fascist dictatorship of any stability. And finally, in Czecho-Slovakia only recently was it possible to form a Government on an extended, but extremely formless basis, whilst in Austria national-fascism jointly with social-fascism is clearing the ground for an open fascist dictatorship.

It goes without saying that all these processes are accompanied by an open attack of the bourgeoisie upon the working-class. As we have already pointed out, in Britain the Labourites are inflicting blow after blow on the vital economic interests of the proletariat; in France the candidate for the dictator's seat, Tardieu, encouraged and supported by the capitalist press, has opened an extensive campaign against the Communist Party, its newspaper, and its organisations, and is establishing an "accelerated procedure" for carrying through the repression of the Communist Party. In Germany the Government of social-fascists is adopting measures for the transference of the reparations burden on to the shoulders of the working-class, is lowering the nominal and the real wage, and foreseeing, as Seizing confessed, an intensification of agitation in the country on this ground, is passing through the Reichstag an exceptional law against the C.P. Polish fascism, dissatisfied with its daily ruthless repressions of the working-class and its party, is bringing into effect a number of special measures, and among these is organising a new great drive against the leaders of the Communist Party.

**I**N this article we have not taken as our task a more detailed analysis of the internal political situation in the countries of Europe. But an understanding of the latest facts from the sphere of the inter-relationships between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries is impossible without an estimate of the situation developing in Europe. It is a fact of great historical significance and great practical importance that during the period determining socialist reconstruction and the creation of socialistic economy in the Soviet Union, bourgeois Europe is confronted once more with cardinal problems of capitalist economy in a severe form. International imperialism has to face up to the insolubility of the more important tasks connected with its existence, at the very moment when the growth of the socialist union, the success of the new system engendered by the socialist revolution, is becoming a more and more obvious fact and, a point which is highly important, is becoming evident to the widest sections of the proletarian masses throughout the world. It can be said with confidence that this contradistinction will play a larger and larger part in the international situation. With every new month the carrying out of the five-year plan, the industrialisation of the Soviet Union, the collectivisation of agriculture, the achievement of a number of other enormous tasks by the working-class of the U.S.S.R., and at the same time the fact that every new day brings its further economic difficulties in the capitalist countries, a further intensification of the class antagonisms in the capitalist world, and further repressions of the proletariat, will result in the basic antagonism of the present day—the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world—coming more and more to the forefront.

And those characteristic features which we have tried to point out in the present-day international situation are bound up with this same intensifying manifestation of antagonism between the large imperialist powers and the Soviet Union. A direct and clear illustration of this process was provided by the intervention of the capitalist powers in connection with the Soviet-Chinese conflicts.

**I**N a brief note attached to the leading article in our last number it was pointed out that the intervention of the powers cannot be regarded

as other than an original form of intervention in the U.S.S.R. The further events have shown that this estimate was absolutely sound. The attitude of the participants in the intervention, the position taken up by various countries, the support to intervention forthcoming throughout the world from all the known and open enemies of the Soviet Union, all showed that the imperialists' "diplomatic action" was nothing, other than a prototype of the coming military interventions against the U.S.S.R. One of the newspapers of the German banking and merchant capital, the *Berliner Boersen Kourier*, provided an interesting estimate of the events. "The dispute between the two great Powers—Russia and America—has very little in common with the struggle on the Manchurian front, for on both sides the talk is of the establishing of their world might.... In all this episode the only essential factor is that it is America which wishes to justify its world authority by a practical example, whilst the Soviet Union disputes these pretensions." Ignoring the terminology of a bourgeois newspaper, it has to be admitted that this formula is absolutely sound in its view of the situation. In its capacity of recognised leader of the imperialist world, the United States headed the demonstration which was to remind the Soviet Union of the might of imperialism, in whose hands is the fate of each country and that of the international situation. The historical significance of the dispute between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union consists in the circumstance that the latter has proved in action that the limits of imperialist influence are coincident with the frontiers of the imperialist countries.

To make clear the significance of recent events, certain more important facts must be recalled. Immediately after the Chinese generals, spurred on by their imperialist counsellors, had seized the Chinese-Eastern Railway and violated the agreement concluded on the basis of equal rights with the Soviet Union, the imperialist States attempted to interfere in the conflict and came out with the proposal for "mediation." After this "mediation" had been rejected by the Soviet Government the question was immediately raised, first and foremost in the pages of the imperialists' colonial press in China, of the "internationalisation" of the Chinese-Eastern Railway, in other words, of its being handed over to a few im-

perialist States. The same Stimson who in November spoke "in defence of peace" had in July sent out a memorandum to the Powers in which he put forward the idea of the transference of the Chinese-Eastern Railway to the imperialists. This ruse was unsuccessful and the capitalist Powers temporarily took up a waiting attitude. They counted on the Soviet Union getting into a mess. They expected that the Soviet country would be unable to defend its own interests.

The development of events showed that the imperialists were out in their reckonings. Whilst it became increasingly clearer that the Chinese reaction was in no condition to dominate the situation in the country, that the deep subterranean movements occurring in China were extremely weakening the position of the Nanking and Mukden cliques, the Soviet Union on the other hand, working on the basis of its increasingly strong economic position and in the might of the Red Army—unique in the world by its consciousness and its genuineness as a people's army—resisted the Chinese generals and the White guard bands.

And just when it had become evident that the Soviet-Chinese conflict would be regulated on conditions acceptable to the Soviet Union, and that the clique of generals were about to retreat, the imperialist Powers considered it necessary to make a new and broader attempt at intervention. The United States headed this move, for in this case the question was of special importance to them. As the conference on naval armaments was in the offing, the United States needed by some act or other to strengthen their dominant position by comparison with other Powers. Consequently, after assuring the agreement of France, with its old direct financial interests in Manchuria, the United States then brought pressure to bear on Britain. According to the European press the United States Secretary of State took special steps in London to stimulate the Labour Government to take active part in maintaining the "authority of the Kellogg Pact." This pressure was superfluous. Even without it the Labourites had manifested great initiative and Henderson himself was the first of the Ministers of the large imperialist Powers to announce the forthcoming move. But when, after this move of the powers, it was evident that it had been unsuccessful, and the London press

were endeavouring to exploit this circumstance and to decry the Kellogg Pact and the U.S.A. policy somewhat, the American President, as we learnt from Washington telegrams, "gave it to be understood" that if any doubt were to be expressed concerning the utility of the Kellogg Pact, the U.S.A. would have to reconsider its policy in regard to naval disarmament. In other words, the U.S.A. indicated that even that partial compromise on certain problems of naval disarmament which had been promised to MacDonald might not be achieved if Britain attempted to weaken such an instrument of American diplomacy as the Kellogg Pact. And on the other hand, it is undoubtedly no accident that only a few days after Japan, defending its own interests in Manchuria, had refused to join in the demonstration of the Powers, Britain and America jointly made "diplomatic representations" in Tokio, directed against the Japanese demands on the question of cruiser construction. It is not wise to exaggerate the mutual dependence of these questions, but undoubtedly the most varied methods of political pressure and diplomatic bargaining were brought into play in the Powers' anti-Soviet move.

This circumstance was particularly clearly revealed when it became a question of attaching the second-rate countries to the great Powers' move. The methods which were resorted to by the ruling imperialist spoliators, and the speed and humility with which various countries declared their "readiness for service" are of interest inasmuch as they, in their turn, are illustrative of the future preparations for a direct military attack on the U.S.S.R. In their manœuvre the United States were unconditionally joined by the central American States dependent on them: Panama, Cuba, San Domingo, and Mexico; the British vassal, Egypt, announced its adhesion; Holland, closely associated with British capital and with oil imperialism, was one of the first to participate in the interference with the Soviet-Chinese conflict. Among the European countries Germany declined to take formal part in the Powers' move, but announced its complete support. Fascist Italy hastened to prove its "great power" status and in one day announced its support to France, Britain and the U.S.A. Finally, the countries of the Little Entente unconditionally supported diplomatic intervention against the

U.S.S.R. Moreover, in every one of the European capitals the imperialist diplomacy gave direct instructions to the Governments of the little countries, and the latter acted in accordance with the instructions received.

The result was a complete united front of imperialist intervention against the Soviet Union. At the moment they had to confine themselves to diplomatic notes, but undoubtedly in their own good time the imperialists will consider it necessary to send their armies. And one may not doubt that the despatch of these armies and the war activities will develop with approximately the same ceremonial as was adopted with the diplomatic notes. But at the same time one can be assured that the Soviet Union will put up just as determined a resistance to the military activities as was shown to the diplomatic interference.

Meantime, the resistance of the socialist Soviet Union to the hegemony of the capitalist world has proved decisive and effective. The entire world bourgeois press was forced to admit that the Soviet Union had won a complete success. And although American diplomacy demanded that the world press, and in particular, as we have already noted, the British press should regard all that had occurred as a success, in reality we are faced with the fact of the failure of a great, widely prepared anti-Soviet ruse.

**T**HE importance of the Soviet success goes far beyond the bounds of the present moment. The Soviet Union's successful defence of its position in face of a united front of the entire capitalist world is in principle an important event in the foreign policy of the proletarian State. The working-class of the U.S.S.R. has shown that the confident achievement of socialist reconstruction, its resistance to opportunist vacillations, its revolutionary determination in carrying through the economic transformation of the country, and in the attack upon the last positions of the class enemy in the Soviet Union, are not only consolidating the internal political and economic basis of the Soviet State, but are strengthening its international position. The proletarians of all countries have become even more convinced by this example that the socialist "fatherland of all toilers," the rallying base of the world revolution, stands on stable foundations and is in a condition to resist

the strongest attacks of imperialism and its lieutenants.

None the less, this fact by no means signifies any lessening of the war danger for the Soviet Union. The imperialists' attack has been shattered, but their forces are not in the least destroyed, their activity is by no means brought to a halt. On the contrary, it cannot be doubted that the imperialists will continue their struggle against the Soviet Union with redoubled energy and with greatly intensified class hostility. One of the nearest enemies of the Union, nobility-ridden Roumania, is already drawing the conclusions from the new situation. The organ of the Roumanian military circles—*Universal*—made the following declaration after Stimson's manifesto and the U.S.S.R.'s reply :

"The aggressiveness of the U.S.S.R. justifies the measures which we have adopted for the defence of Roumania. It is necessary first and foremost to create a strong army even in peace time, for there are Powers who regard international treaties and conventions as scraps of paper. The events in Manchuria can serve Roumania as an instructive lesson." The Roumanian war organ has quite openly formulated its task, just as the general staffs of the majority of the imperialist countries also undoubtedly see it. The obviously increasing strength of the Soviet Union demands new counter-measures, it urges on to a strengthening of positions in the coming war on the U.S.S.R., and consequently of the positions along the Soviet frontier first and foremost.

**I**N fact, during recent days there is to be observed an increase of activity of anti-Soviet elements along the western frontier of the Soviet Union. Roumania's intentions are clear enough even from the quotation we have given. Only recently Poland demonstrated her "friendship" for Roumania and strengthened the Polish-Roumanian military alliance. Following on this, Polish fascism has decided to strengthen its rear in preparation for a military attack on the U.S.S.R. As a result, for the first time since the end of the world war there has been a lessening of the disagreements between Poland and Germany. The social-fascists in power in Germany have long been agitating for a *rapprochement* with Poland. In their anti-Soviet policy, in their work for drawing Germany into

a united anti-Soviet front, the German social-democrats have long realised the necessity of a Polish-German agreement. Now the German Government has partially realised these plans, by concluding an agreement with Poland for the liquidation of financial claims, and is feverishly preparing to sign the trade agreement. This German-Polish *rapprochement*, which is contrary to all Germany's fundamental political hopes in Eastern Europe, and which in turn demands of Poland certain concessions, is nothing but a conspiracy between Polish fascism and German social-fascism, to facilitate the struggle against the Soviet Union.

Simultaneously Polish fascism is organising a united front against the U.S.S.R. on a second flank. During recent months it has become increasingly clear that Latvia is to a considerable extent dependent on Polish imperialism. Poland is carrying on an active struggle directed towards neutralising the economic interests which might restrain the Latvian bourgeoisie from an open attack on the U.S.S.R.

Finally, in regard to Lithuania, Polish imperialism is trying to feign the semblance of peaceable gestures, with the same object of forging a single anti-Soviet Baltic bloc. And even in regard to the "free city" of Danzig considerable pressure is being brought to bear. Danzig recently passed certain measures against the white emigrés. This circumstance aroused the extreme indignation of the Polish press, which demanded that Danzig should be duly slapped. And the commissar of the League of Nations took upon himself the execution of this open anti-Soviet machination.

But the anti-Soviet activity of Polish fascism, rent as it is by internal economic antagonisms, is not restricted to external political steps. Polish fascism is trying to exploit also those internal processes which are going on among the Ukrainian bourgeoisie in Western Ukraine for its own purposes. The representatives of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism have become convinced that the Ukrainian bourgeoisie has nothing to expect from Soviet Ukraine, and so have taken the path of co-operation with Polish fascism. And it is obvious that this co-operation is one of the elements of struggle against the U.S.S.R. in Western Ukraine.

Finally, to the north of the Soviet Union new anti-Soviet tendencies are becoming stronger.

Aroused by the struggle for markets, and fearing internal political complications, the Swedish bourgeoisie are strengthening their imperialist expansion. This expansion is directed chiefly towards the Baltic Sea basin, and logically leads to Sweden entering upon energetic work for the creation of a Scandinavian-Baltic anti-Soviet bloc.

We see that at the very moment when the Soviet Union has made a breach in the attack on her eastern frontiers, energetic work is going on for a strengthening of the anti-Soviet advance-posts on her western frontiers. But of course this does not exhaust the activities of the imperialists. The financial capital of the large bourgeois countries is evermore seriously applying itself to the Soviet problem. And although the approaching economic crisis and the hopeless struggle for markets dictates a strengthening of economic links with the Soviet Union to certain countries, simultaneously there is a growing recognition of the fact that the influential international capitalist groupings are seeking ways towards new forms of economic blockade against the U.S.S.R. These phenomena call for a special and serious analysis. Our task in this article consists in specifying the basic features of the international political situation from the viewpoint of the inter-relationships between the U.S.S.R. and the imperialist States.

Obviously this estimate of the international situation confirms the general survey which we made at the beginning of this article. The period of intensification of imperialist antagonisms and of rise in the class struggle is characterised also by a deepening of the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world. It is growing ever clearer to the international bourgeoisie that the five-year plan not only signifies an advance of socialism in Soviet Russia, but heralds a general offensive activity of the world revolutionary movement. The Communist Parties, whilst fighting for the accomplishment of the various tasks confronting the proletariat of each and every country, must understand and remember the basic processes of which the day-to-day struggle of the various sections of the Comintern are merely part. The ruthless engagements with the attacking bourgeoisie which the proletariat of Europe and America are now having to resist in connection with the imminent economic crisis, the intensification of the antagonisms between the land of socialism and the countries of capitalism, together with the developed advance of the socialist sector in the Soviet Union itself, are all facts which separately and in the aggregate indicate that the long awaited decisive struggle is approaching.

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# The Course of a Great Revolution

By V. Levin

**T**HE control figures of national economy for 1929-30 recently approved by the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. forecast tasks for all spheres of national economy which are quite exceptional in their extent.

The change in the direction of accelerating national economy and especially its socialised sector, which was the characteristic feature of the results of 1928-29, a change accompanied by an enormous strengthening of the position of the working-class and a further very considerable consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Soviet Russia, will be further developed in 1929-30.

The rates of increase of production adopted in the plan for 1929-30 are based on the results of 1928-29 and especially on the latter half of the year. Those rates not only refute the theory of a decline in the development of economy, but also leave far behind the projects of the recently confirmed five-year plan. The wave of revolutionary enthusiasm and the creative initiative of the masses of the working-class, which have found expression in "socialist rivalry" and in the transference to the uninterrupted production-week, and the urge of the masses of poor and middle peasantry to collective farms, have caused considerable adjustments in the projects of the five-year plan.

The working-class of Soviet Russia has now passed from skirmishes to a general advance along the whole front of socialist construction. A guarantee of the success of this advance is provided by the circumstance that it is being carried out by the working-class with the strong support of all the poor and middle peasantry. Here, in the consolidation of the alliance between the working-class and the poor and middle peasantry is the reason for the successes which were achieved in 1928-29, and here also is the reason for the enormous advance which we are undertaking in 1929-30.

The results of 1928-29 and the plan for 1929-30 completely refute the views of the right wingers in our Party as to the impossibility of the rates of industrialisation which have been undertaken, and as to the inevitability of a split

between the working-class and the poor and middle peasantry if those rates be maintained. The figures and facts completely shatter these erroneous predictions. It is now clear that our accelerated advance towards socialism will be all the more successful the more resolutely we wage the struggle with "right" and with "left" deviations in the Party and with any conciliatory attitudes towards those deviations.

The accuracy of the line carried on by our Leninist Party under the guidance of its C.C., the successes which we have achieved in the cause of socialist construction in Soviet Russia, successes which inspire our friends for the struggle and put our enemies in a rage, can be proved by facts and figures. And behind these stand millions of toilers, millions of workers in the Soviet Union, who are building a new society with profound conviction of their ultimate triumph. These figures constitute the most dispassionate testimony possible to the results of our heroic struggle and to the advantages which the Soviet political system confers on the working-class. These figures reveal how the working-class of the Soviet Union is realising in practice Lenin's task of overtaking and surpassing the leading capitalist countries in the technical and economic realm. Each of these figures is a fact which cannot be got over by all the fury directed against the first country of proletarian dictatorship in the world.

## THE GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATIONAL INCOME.

The five-year plan started from the basis of the annual increase in the national income in fixed prices throughout the year being an average of 15-16%, which provided for an increase of 3-4% over the average growth of the national income during the five years preceding the first year of the five-year plan : 1928-29. The five-year plan proposed a rate of increase in 1928-29 at the level of the average rate of increase during the period preceding the five-year plan. (11.7%). The above-mentioned change in the direction of an intensified rate of growth in the annual

income was to have begun from 1929-30, the second year of the five-year plan. During this second year the increase in the national income was to have been at the rate of 15.8%.

When the five-year plan was being drawn up, many pointed out that such a rate of increase in the annual national income, being dependent on the high rates of growth of the national economy projected in the five-year plan, were without historical precedent, and that they were unreal and demonstrated that the five-year plan as a whole was unrealisable within the period fixed.

The results of 1928-29 reveal that the actual increase of national income in that year surpassed that projected in the five-year plan, being 12.4% instead of the 11.7% proposed in the plan. The change projected for 1929-30 in the plan will be definitely realised, but it will occur at rates considerably surpassing the proposals of the five-year plan ; instead of an increase of 15.8% in the national income the control figures anticipate, an increase of 20.4%, i.e., almost double the average rate of annual increase to which we have been accustomed in preceding years. In terms of absolute levels this increase constitutes a sum of about 60,000,000,000 roubles instead of the 27,458,000,000 roubles in 1928-29 and the 33,059,000,000 in 1929-30). There is to be a continuation of the systematic increase of the specific proportion of industry in the national economy : instead of 34.8% in 1928-29 it is to be 37.1% in 1929-30 : i.e., there will be a trend clearly reflecting the practical results of the course for the industrialisation of the country.

The considerable increase of prices for agricultural products beyond that anticipated in the plan, the disparity between prices for these products in the socialised sector and on the private market, the extensive speculation in these products which developed in connection with this, brought with them in 1928-29 a redistribution beyond what was anticipated in the plan of about 400,000,000 to 500,000,000 roubles in favour of the countryside and chiefly in favour of its upper sections.

As the result of this redistribution and the increased qualitative indicators which were anticipated in the plan in regard to the work of the socialised sector of economy, the proletariat's share in the 1928-29 national income remained stable, whilst the rate of increase in the income

per individual peasant proved to be somewhat higher than the rate of increase in income of the workers. This is the first time of recent years that there has been such a distribution of national income. One of the most important tasks of the 1929-30 plan is to overcome these unfavourable tendencies in the distribution of the national income. In the control figures this task has been resolved so that whilst there is to be an increase in the income of the agricultural proletariat by 16.1% and in that of farms united in collective farms by 93.4%, the income of the individual peasant farms will increase by 3.5% and that of the workers by 19.1%. The specific share of the workers in the national income will rise from 15.7% in 1928-29 to 16.2% in 1929-30. With these estimates one may be allowed to think that the task of achieving a more favourable distribution of the national income to the working-class than that of 1928-29 has been achieved in the control figures.

The control figures for 1929-30 anticipate enormous movements in the realm of the distribution of national income into consumption and accumulation. Recent years have shown a systematic *decrease* year by year in the share of the national income allotted to the population's personal (including collective) consumption, with a systematic *increase* in the rate of consumption per head. The decrease in the consumption share of the national income was at an average of 2 % per annum. In 1928-29 72.5% of the total national income went to personal consumption. In 1929-30 the share of personal consumption is to drop from this figure to 65.6% i.e., not quite 7%, whilst there is to be a slight increase in the rate of consumption per head ; in other words, almost the entire increase in national income in 1929-30 is to be thrown into accumulation. Hence arise the colossal rates of increase in capital investment which have been adopted in the 1929-30 plan.

Whilst directing attention to these estimates, it has also to be said that the tendencies and the order of the various factors are here accurately shown. This co-relationship between consumption and accumulation in the national income gives the fundamental aspect of the plan for 1929-30 ; this correlation gives a very full conception of the intensity of the plan and of the exceptional efforts which are necessary in order to carry it out.

## WAGES AND THE PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOUR.

In connection with the correlationship between consumption and accumulation in 1929-30 one has to consider the question of the workers' real wages. It is in this connection that the important manœuvre which is anticipated in the plan for this year with a view to safeguarding the workers' real wages is most clearly evident.

The enormous tasks of the plan are unattainable without a very considerable increase in real wages and in work. The plan anticipates an increase of not less than 12% in real wages, which is to be achieved by a nominal increase of 9% and a reduction in the cost of the workers' budgetary items by 2.5% to 3%, both through a lowering of prices and through a modification in the correlationship of various sectors. Taking into consideration the fact that in 1928-29 the plan for raising the workers' real wages was not completely carried out (it rose by about 4% instead of by the 5.2% laid down in the plan) it becomes quite obvious that a rise of real wages to the extent anticipated in the plan, taken in conjunction with the accomplishment of the plan in the sphere of increase in the productivity of labour, is an important task of 1929-30. In the C.C.'s resolution on the control figures for 1929-30, the section on wages and the productivity of labour reads : "A highly important task of the current economic year and a deciding condition of the execution of the proposed plan of development of industry has to be an increase in the productivity of labour by 25%, with an increase in the nominal wage by 9% and in the real wage by not less than 12%."

We have already said that the consumption per head of the population throughout the country will rise slightly in 1929-30. In such conditions an increase by 12% in the workers' real wage can be achieved chiefly by a considerable redistribution of the general consumption fund among the various classes of the population, by an increase in workers' consumption at the expense of a reduction in the consumption of the non-proletarian sections of the population.

With the restricted nature of the general consumption fund in the country, and the impossibility of any more or less considerable manœuvres along the line of an export-import plan, such a redistribution involves great difficulties. It will not be an exaggeration to

say that the 1929-30 plan lays the emphasis on a high standard of work on the part of the distribution organs first and foremost, and on a rise in the standard of their work at the very least to the level of the workers themselves.

The guarantee of a real growth in wages by 12% is one of the most important tasks of the current economic year. That task must be accomplished at all costs.

## THE INCREASE IN THE BASIC FUNDS.

The considerable share of the national income to go into accumulation as against last year and against also the project of the five-year plan finds expression in a corresponding increase in the country's basic funds, and in particular in the industrial funds. The plan for 1929-30 anticipates the general dimensions of capital investment in national economy to be 12,948,000,000 roubles, as against the 8,531,000,000 of 1928-29 and that of 10,200,000,000 in the five-year plan. In other words, there is to be an increase of 54% over last year and of almost 3,000,000,000 in comparison with the five-year plan.

If from this total sum of investments in national economy we deduct the investments of the private sector (chiefly investments of individual peasants' farms in buildings) and the investments of the socialised sector of economy going to cover depreciation—in other words, if we separate investments for the extension of reproduction in the socialist sector of economy, in 1929-30 it constitutes 10,049,000,000 roubles as against the 4,537,000,000 of 1928-29. In other words, it will be more than doubled. In this regard the correlationship of investments in the socialist and private sectors according to their assignment is extremely characteristic ; whilst, in the socialist sector, out of the total sum of investments in industry and electrification 11% goes to covering depreciation and 89% to the extension of reproduction, in the private sector 66% goes to cover depreciation and only 34% to extension of reproduction. The same applies to agriculture ; of the investments in the socialist sector, 8% goes to cover depreciation and 92% to extension of production ; whereas in the private sector 77% goes to cover depreciation and only 23% to extension of reproduction. Taking all the spheres of national economy together, of the total sums of capital investments

in the socialist sector, 14% goes to cover depreciation and 86% to extension of production ; whereas in the private sector 77% goes to, cover depreciation and only 23% to extension of production. Hence the total basic funds of the country are to rise from 74,501,000,000 roubles at the end of 1928-29 to 85,163,000,000 roubles at the end of 1929-30.

The last few years have revealed an annual increase in the country's basic funds by an average of 4,000,000,000 roubles, increasing annually by 6%-7%. 1928-29 yielded an increase in the basic funds to the extent of about 5,000,000,000 roubles, or a percentage increase over 1927-28 of 7.2%. The plan for 1929-30 anticipates an increase in the basic funds to the extent of approximately 11,000,000,000 roubles, or double that of last year.

We get a still clearer picture in the sphere of the movement of the basic funds of the socialist sector of economy. From a sum of 40,306,000,000 roubles at the end of 1928-29 these latter have to amount to 50,283,000,000 roubles at the end of 1929-30. During recent years the funds of the socialist sector of economy have yielded an average annual increase of about 2,500,000,000 roubles, or about 60% of the increase in all the basic funds of the country. With a general increase in the total basic funds of the country by about 5,000,000,000 roubles, 1928-29 yielded an increase in the basic funds of the socialist sector of economy by 4,400,000,000 roubles, or about 85% of the increase in the total basic funds. The plan for 1929-30 provides for a total increase in basic funds by about 11,000,000,000 roubles and an increase in the basic funds of the socialist sector of economy by about 10,000,000,000 roubles, i.e., over 90% of the increase in the total basic funds of the country. Moreover, in 1929-30 the basic funds of the socialist sector of economy have to increase by 25% over those of 1928-29, i.e., by a full 25% in one year.

Such are the chief figures indicative of the rates of increase in the economic might of the country of proletarian dictatorship. Such are the results of the struggle which is being carried on between the socialist and the private-capitalist wings of economy in Soviet Russia. Such are the enormous movements which are projected in the realm of capital investment for 1929-30. The most hasty analysis of these

figures shows that in 1929-30 we shall continue to develop the successes achieved in 1928-29, that in 1929-30 we shall break away even from the rates of increase in capital investment customary of recent years. In 1929-30 we are to carry out a programme of doubling investments in the socialised sector of economy by comparison with last year. We are leaving far behind the projects of the five-year plan, which to so many appeared unrealisable only a few months ago.

#### THE PLAN OF CAPITAL INVESTMENTS.

This enormous increase in the general extent of capital investments in national economy during 1929-30 is to have its corollary in the exceptionally high rates of increase in capital investment which have been adopted for the various spheres of economy.

The five-year plan anticipates an annual increase of capital investments in planned industry and electrification at an average of about 600,000,000 roubles, with a swift rate of increase in investment during the first years and a somewhat slower rate in the last two years of the five-year plan. According to the plan the capital investments in planned industry and electrification in 1928-29 were to amount to approximately 2,000,000,000 roubles. According to the plan in 1929-30 these investments were to have amounted to 2,800,000,000 roubles. The control figures for 1929-30 anticipate capital investments in planned industry and electrification to the extent of over 4,000,000,000 i.e., double that of last year and 1,200,000,000 more than was laid down in the five-year plan. Moreover, the extent of investments in planned industry alone (excluding electrification) in 1929-30 amount to a (nominal) sum approximately equal to the investments postulated for the last (1932-33) year of the five-year plan, whilst investments in electrification are to amount to the (nominal) sum equal to the investments of the third (1930-31) year of the plan.

To get a clear idea of the extent of investments proposed for 1929-30 the following figures for planned industry have also to be taken into account : during all the five years from 1923-24 to 1927-28 inclusive the sum of such investments amounted to 3,600,000,000 as against the 3,500,000,000 roubles of the current year's

investments. Of recent years the investments in spheres producing means of production amounted to 76% to 77% of the total sum of investments in industry; in 1929-30 the percentage is to rise to 85%, as against the 77% laid down in the plan.

There are also movements occurring in the distribution of the total sum of capital investments in industry according to their assignment. From year to year there is a diminution in the specific proportion of investments in fundamental overhauls (9.3% in 1928-29 and 4.4% in 1929-30) in the reconstruction and extension of existing enterprises (49.6% in 1928-29 and 38.7% in 1929-30) and a corresponding increase in the specific proportion of new construction. Of the total sum of capital investments in industry for 1929-30, 47.2% is assigned to the construction of new works, as against 33.5% in 1928-29.

An especially considerable increase in capital investments as compared with the five-year plan is projected in the leading spheres of heavy industry. Thus investments in the metal industry are to increase by comparison with the plan by 154%, in the fuel industry by 127%, in the electro-technical industry by 193.5%, in the chemical industry by 167%, and so on.

As the result of the dimensions of capital investments in industry adopted in the 1929-30 plan its basic funds will increase in one year by 35% as against the 19% increase in 1928-29 and 15% in 1927-28.

#### THE INCREASE IN OUTPUT OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION.

The above indicated rate of increase of capital investments in planned industry, taken in conjunction with the introduction of the unbroken production-week for a large part of industry, the extensive development of "socialist rivalry" and the considerably accelerated periods for the construction of new works projected in the plan, afford the possibility of taking higher indicators of the increase of industrial production than were provided for in the plan.

A severe struggle was carried on for a long time with the bourgeois economists of the type of Groman, Bazarov and their school over the question of the real rates of annual increase of industrial production during the reconstruction

period. This school argued that it was not possible to attain a rate of increase surpassing 10% per annum. Such an under-estimation of the possibilities of the reconstruction period and of the preponderant quality of our system of planned economy was also characteristic of the first draft of the five-year plan, which the party did not adopt.

The plan adopted by the party anticipated a percentage annual increase of production in planned industry from 21% in the first year to 25% in the last of the five years. According to the plan 1928-29 was to have given an increase in production in planned industry of 21.5%. But the results of the year showed an increase of almost 24%, whilst the increase in the production of spheres producing means of production was about 30% and that of spheres producing articles of consumption about 19%. For 1929-30 the five-year plan anticipates an increase in the gross production of planned industry by 21.5%, the group producing means of production to grow by 26% and that producing articles of consumption by 18%. The plan for 1929-30 anticipates an increase in the production of planned industry by 32%, the group producing equipment and means of production to increase by 45% and that producing articles of consumption by 22%.

Every economist or business man acquainted with the history of economy knows quite well that such high rates as are indicated by an increase of the basic funds of industry in such a large country as the Soviet Union by 35% in one year, an increase of gross industrial production by 32% in one year, and an increase in the production of heavy industry by 45% in one year, are rates which are not only unknown to, and which cannot be known to any capitalist country, but are a record even for the Soviet Union. This is particularly important because the restoration period of our economy has long since been passed. (The gross production of all census industry—with fifteen workers or more—is in 1929-30 to amount to 210.5% of 1913 production, estimated in pre-war prices.) All that could be exploited of the basic capital of industry inherited from Tsarist Russia has already been exploited. 1929-30 is a year of profound reconstruction of the entire national economy of the Union, and especially of industry as the leading sphere of economy. We

can no longer achieve an increase in industrial production mechanically, by putting inactive equipment into motion. Every percentage in the increase of industrial production is the result of either bringing new works into action, or the reconstruction of the old works and the rationalisation of their activity. Under such conditions the rates of increase in industrial production adopted for the 1929-30 plan represent a very summary and very convincing testimony to the advantages which are inherent in the planned direction of economy, and possible only under a proletarian dictatorship, by comparison with the capitalist methods of governing industry. And it has to be emphasised very definitely that the increase in industrial production adopted for 1929-30 is not an "episode." It is a new stage. There is every justification for declaring that we shall have an approximately similar rate of annual increase in industrial production through all the successive years of the five-year plan.

#### THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE QUALITY OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY. REDUCTION OF COST PRICE.

This rate of increase in the quantitative indicators of industrial activity must have its corollary in the qualitative indicators. This is all the more necessary since the five-year plan anticipated very high qualitative indicators, whereas in 1928-29, whilst there the plan was surpassed in the realm of quantitative indicators there was a failure to accomplish the whole plan in the realm of qualitative indicators. Hence we have a very real threat of a disparity between the quantitative and the qualitative increase of industry—a very dangerous disparity, a disparity which we must avoid.

Hence arise the high demands made by the plan in regard to all the qualitative indicators of industrial activity, hence the urgent necessity of achieving these qualitative indicators in their entirety.

In 1928-29 the reduction in the cost price of industrial production was to have amounted to 7% in face of an increase in the productivity of labour by 17% and of the nominal wage by 8.1%, whereas the results of the year show a drop in cost price only to the extent of 5% in face of a rise in productivity of labour by 16% and a rise in nominal wages of about 10%. Nor did industry fulfil the task of lowering prices during

1928-29. And finally, industry did not accomplish the task of lowering the cost of construction work. In other words, there was a lag behind the plan in all the qualitative indicators. Moreover, certain workers in industry in the localities took the most objectively injurious course of worsening the quality of production both in light and also partially in heavy industry.

The plan for 1929-30 anticipates a drop in the cost price of industrial production by 11%, with a rise in the productivity of labour by 25%, and in real wages by not less than 12%.

The experience of 1928-29 and particularly of its second six months showed that industry still has enormous reserves to be drawn upon in the reduction of cost price, that given great attention from the party organs and the T.U. organisations to this task, and the mobilisation of the mass of workers for its accomplishment, this task can and should be accomplished during the current year.

In the realm of reduction of industrial prices the plan anticipates an average fall in prices by 2.5%, the fall in heavy industry to amount to 4% and in light industry to amount to 1%. So far as the latter group is concerned, the fall in prices will be achieved only in regard to commodities occupying a considerable importance in the budgetary items of the worker, and in the case of the worker co-operative-consumer the fall will be as much as 2%. In view of the fact that the reduction of the cost of the workers' budgetary items by 2.5% is mainly based on this 2%, and that this reduction in turn is bound up with a rise in real wages by 12%, this fall in prices must be accomplished in its entirety. The tendency observable even recently, in co-operatives to raise prices on the articles entering into the workers' budgetary group must be resolutely checked.

There is to be a drop of 14% in the cost of industrial construction as a whole, whilst the drop in cost of new construction has to reach 18%. In 1929-30 it is necessary to effect a decided revolution in the achievement of this very important qualitative indicator of industrial activity.

Together with the fulfilment of all the quantitative and the qualitative indicators of the plan for industrial activity, 1929-30 has to see a resolute change in the direction of a considerable improvement in the quality of the production in

all spheres of industry. Any deterioration in the quality of production has to be regarded as a distortion of the party line, as an objective injury.

Such are the basic factors in the plan for 1929-30 so far as industry, the chief link in all national economy, is concerned. And such are the exceptionally high rates of industrialisation which have been adopted for 1929-30.

#### THE INCREASE OF INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE.

The enormous increase in capital investment in industry is to have its corollary in a considerable increase in the programme for agriculture, not only by comparison with the previous year, but even as against the five-year plan. In this sphere of national economy the plan for 1929-30 anticipates enormous movements. The total cost of the measures planned for agriculture in one way or another financed and planned by the State is in 1929-30 to amount to the sum of 3,162,000,000 roubles, as against the 1,104,000,000 which represented the cost of such measures in 1927-28, and the 1,805,000,000 for 1928-29, and against the 2,499,000,000 estimated for 1929-30 in the five-year plan. In other words, there is to be an increase over last year by 75% and over the specification of the five-year plan by approximately 600,000,000 roubles.

Together with a great increase in the general dimensions of the resources to be invested in agriculture, the plan for 1929-30 anticipates that of the general sum of investments in agriculture there shall be a considerable increase in the specific share of resources invested by State and co-operative organisations and peasant farms by comparison with what obtained in the previous years, and a considerable diminution in the specific proportion of financing from the State budget and through credits. Thus, with an increase in the total sum of investments in agriculture by 75% over 1928-29, the finance drawn from the State budget and credit is to increase only by 59%. This tendency, which unquestionably is essentially a sound one, none the less demands great activity in its accomplishment by the local organs.

It is impermissible to throw the whole work of raising and reconstructing agriculture on the shoulders of the State. Every year should see a growing, not merely absolute, but relative, increase in the resources invested in this work by

the peasants themselves. The mobilisation of these resources and their sound, rational direction is one of the most important tasks of 1929-30 in the realm of agriculture.

As the result of this rise in investment in agriculture during 1929-30 there is to be an accelerated increase in the funds of agriculture as compared with previous years. This increase is to amount to 5.9% as against 3.1% in 1928-29. This increase in the rates of growth of the agricultural funds is to occur chiefly at the cost of the unusually large capital investments in the socialised sector of agriculture projected for 1929-30.

There is to be a complete revolution in the rates of increase in the socialised sector of agriculture. The capital investments in this sector are in 1929-30 to amount to 1,153,000,000 roubles as compared with 294,000,000 in 1928-29 and 112,000,000 in 1927-28; i.e., the investment plan adopted for 1929-30 provides for almost four times as much investment as last year. In 1929-30 the financing of Soviet farms from the State budget and from credit is to amount to 365,000,000 roubles, as compared with 148,000,000 in 1928-29 and 43,000,000 in 1927-28. The financing of collective farms from the same sources in 1929-30 is to amount to 348,000,000 as against 139,000,000 in 1928-29 and 68,000,000 in 1927-28.

#### MACHINERY ON THE LAND.

The supply of agriculture with tractors is growing at exceptionally high rates. During 1928-29 about 10,000 tractors were sent into the villages, and the total number of tractors working in agriculture at the end of 1928-29 amounted to about 35,000. In 1929-30 a further 40,000 tractors are to be sent out, and there will be double the number of tractors working in agriculture. All these tractors are going exclusively into the socialised sector.

Despite this high output, the increase of tractors in agriculture is lagging badly behind the rate of increase of the socialised sector itself and behind the most urgent needs for tractors. In the current year the percentage of the total area of Soviet farms which is to be worked by tractors will show a considerable increase by comparison with last year. The rate of increase of tractors in the Soviet farms is overtaking the

rate of increase of sown area. In 1929-30 there will be tractors with an aggregate of 285,000 horse power at work on the Soviet farms as against 76,000 h.p. in 1928-29, whilst the percentage of land turned over by tractors will increase from 60.6% in 1928-29 to 81% in 1929-30. We have the converse picture in the collective farms; here the increase in sown area is greatly exceeding the increase in tractors. In 1929-30 there will be tractors with an aggregate of 200,000 h.p. at work in the collective farms, as compared with an aggregate of 143,000 h.p. in 1928-29, whilst the percentage of land turned over by tractors will fall from 43.2% in 1928-29 to 17.4% in 1929-30. This severe shortage of tractors will be somewhat alleviated during the current year so far as the large collective farms are concerned by their preferential supply with tractors. But this will not settle the problem. The tractor is the basis of collective agriculture, and a shortage in their supply will act as a brake on the rate of increase of the collective farms.

This shortage of tractors faces us with two tasks: (1) to effect an improvement in the exploitation of the tractors already at work in agriculture (here there are extremely large reserves to be drawn upon) and (2) to force the production of tractors in the country by every means possible. The current year will see the completion of the Stalingrad tractor works, and in 1930-31 this works is due to turn out 25,000 tractors of high horse power. The current year is to see the beginning of the construction of the Cheliabinsk tractor works (in the five-year plan this construction work was to have been begun in 1930-31) and it is to be ready for production within two years. The output of tractors from the Putilov works is being increased. Finally, the current year is to see the beginning of construction of a third tractor works in Kharkov, and this also is to be completed in two years. When this construction programme is completed we shall be the first country in the world in regard to the quantity of tractors turned out. Although by the end of the five years the horse power of the tractors working in the villages will amount to approximately 10,000,000, during the next two years our need of tractors will considerably exceed the possibilities of satisfying the need.

During the current year there is to be a big increase in the supply of machinery to the land.

The programme of machinery supply in 1929-30 will amount to 406,000,000 roubles, as compared with 236,000,000 in 1928-29; whilst the specific proportion of receipts by the socialised sector from the general plan of machinery supply will rise from 35% to 40% in 1928-29 to 60% in 1929-30. The supply of mineral fertilisers will rise from 427,000 tons in 1928-29 to 1,066,000 tons in 1929-30.

Thus in 1929-30 we shall see the first considerable results of the increased rates of industrialisation of the country, in the possibility of a considerable acceleration in the process of mechanising, chemicalising, and collectivising of agriculture. This in turn enables us to plan rates of increase in agriculture for 1929-30 considerably surpassing the projects of the five-year plan, and to raise agriculture to the level of the rates of increase of national economy as a whole and of industry in particular.

#### THE EXTENSION OF AREA SOWN.

In 1930 the aggregate area sown is to rise by 8.3% over that of 1929, whilst the increase in productive area is to amount to 10.5%. The increase of productive area under grain is to amount to 10%, whilst there is to be an increase in fertility of yield by 8%. As a result the grain production in 1930 is to amount to 116.6% of the production in 1929, and the production of rye and wheat specifically is to rise by 35%. The increase in the socialised sector will afford the possibility of projecting an increase in commodity grain production in 1930 at rates higher than the actual increase in gross production. In 1929-30 this increase is to amount to approximately 47% over the past year.

The plan foreshadows a high rate of increase in technical cultures also. The increase in cotton production is to amount to 49%, in flax to 12.5%, in sugar beet to 77%, in oil-seed to 25%, and so on. The commodity proportion of these cultures is to increase correspondingly.

This year stock-rearing occupies a special position among the measures to be applied in the realm of agriculture. Taking the Union as a whole 1928-29 revealed an absolute decline in the total livestock. This decline was the result of natural disasters (shortage of cattle food in a number of areas, and a protracted winter) and of a reduction of stock among the upper groups of

the peasantry. Livestock rearing has now become a very weak link in the total agriculture. The plan for 1929-30 anticipates an increase over last year totals of large horned cattle by 4.5%, of horses by 3.5% and of pigs by 10%. Simultaneously, the socialised sector is to extend considerably in regard to livestock, but in this sphere a beginning has to be made almost from zero. One cannot regard the programme of livestock restoration outlined in the plan as adequate. This especially relates to measures in the sphere of the rates of increase of the socialised sector. The restoration of livestock production ought to proceed at the same rate and by the same methods as those applying in the sphere of grain economy. One of the tasks of the very next few months has to be the drawing up of an extensive programme of measures in the livestock sphere.

Taken in the aggregate the gross production of agriculture is to rise by 13.5% in 1930 as against the 2.7% increase in 1929.

#### THE SOCIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE.

A movement of historical importance is planned in regard to the increase of the socialised sector of agriculture. The rates of increase here proposed so far exceed the projects of the five-year plan that it becomes difficult to compare them. Besides the intensification of the industrial production supply to the land, a further prerequisite to such a vigorous increase in the socialised sector of agriculture is the exceptionally big trend towards collective farms shown not only by the poor peasant, but by the central figure of the countryside, the middle peasant; a trend which was of such strength in 1928-29. The collective farms are ceasing to be islands in a sea of individual peasant farms.

We have approached the complete collectivisation of whole areas and regions. It is already quite evident that the task of collectivising agriculture can be resolved within a period considerably shorter than that which appeared absolutely necessary even quite recently. The period of waiting among the middle peasants has come to an end. By facts close and intelligible to him, and by the experience of his own village the middle peasant has become convinced of the advantages of collective agriculture, and has flowed into the collective farms in a great wave.

The basic characteristic of the poor and middle peasant village at the present time is this intensified trend towards new and more perfect methods of work, the trend towards the extensive application of technical and scientific achievements to agriculture. The middle peasant has seen and been convinced that the application of these achievements is in irreconcilable antagonism to the isolated, petty peasant farm.

The main task now consists in mastering this elemental movement of the great masses of toiling peasantry, in organising this movement, in giving it the direction most acceptable to the proletarian State, and in not allowing the kulak upper groups of the countryside to check the movement or to break it down from within. Such an estimate of the general situation taken in conjunction with the material resources at our command lay at the basis of the plan of increase in the socialised sector of agriculture which has been adopted for 1929-30.

The area sown by Soviet farms at the end of 1928-29 reached 1,816,000 hectares as against the 1,425,000 hectares at the end of 1927-28, i.e., in one year the area sown by Soviet farms increased by 27%. The gross grain production of the Soviet farms in 1928-29 was 12,760,000 centners as against the 9,489,000 centners of 1927-28, i.e., there was an increase of 35%. By the end of 1928-29 the commodity production of the Soviet farms amounted to 7,849,000 centners as against 6,396,000 centners in 1927-28 i.e., it increased by 20%. Such were the dimensions of production in the Soviet farms for 1928-29. Such were the rates of increase in the Soviet farms during the first of the five years.

In 1929-30 a radical break is proposed in the rates of increase of the Soviet farms. Their own areas have to amount to 3,280,000 hectares, i.e., an increase of 83% over the previous year. The area under grain has to amount to 2,478,000 hectares as against 1,152,000 hectares in 1928-29 and 1,500,000 hectares provided for in the five-year plan; i.e., there are to be 1,000,000 hectares more than the five-year plan provided for and a 127% increase over the previous year. Of this amount the Soviet farms of the Grain Trust are in 1929-30 to sow about 1,000,000 hectares and to prepare over 2,500,000 hectares for the 1930-31 sowing season, which is equivalent to the area which the five-year plan proposed to be sown in the last year of its scheme. The gross grain

production in the Soviet farms has to amount to 28,202,000 centners in 1929-30, i.e., there is to be an increase of 120% over the previous year; whilst the commodity grain production is to amount to about 18,000,000 centners, i.e., to increase by 130% over the previous year. Thus, by comparison with the Soviet farms' production increase by 35% last year the plan for 1929-30 will put 18,000,000 centners from the Soviet farms at the State disposition.

By the end of 1928-29 979,000 farms were united in the collective farms, the aggregate sowing area amounting to 4,263,000 hectares, as against the 415,000 farms and 1,389,000 hectares sown in 1927-28. In other words, in one year the number of farms united in collective farms grew by 136%, and the area sown by more than 200%. The collective farms' gross grain production in 1928-29 amounted to 29,100,000 centners, as against the 8,361,000 centners of 1927-28; i.e., there was an increase in the gross production of grain by 250% in one year. The commodity grain production from the collective farms in 1928-29 amounted to 12,717,000 centners as against the 3,604,000 centners of 1927-28; i.e., the commodity production increased by 250% in one year. Summarising, it is obvious that the collective farms and their production increased last year by two-and-a-half times. In addition to these high rates of increase in the collective farms we last year had quite considerable qualitative achievements to our credit, these being expressed first and foremost in an increase in size of the unit of collective farm. Thus in 1927-28 the average area per collective farm was 54 hectares, whereas in 1928-29 the average area was 82 hectares.

For 1929-30 we anticipate still higher rates of increase in the collective farms. The number of farms to combine is to reach 3,130,000, i.e., the figure is to increase to more than thrice that of last year. The area sown is to amount to 15,000,000 hectares, i.e., it is to increase three-and-a-half times over last year. The gross grain production is to amount to 103,797,000 centners, or an increase by more than three-and-a-half times over last year. The commodity grain production is to amount to 48,785,000 centners, or to increase almost four times over last year. Thus already in 1930 the collective farms should be providing the State with 48,785,000 centners of grain.

The five-year plan provided that as the result of the increase in collective farms it would be possible to reduce the number of individual peasant farms by 1 to 1.2 millions at the end of the five years. How far we have already exceeded the five-year plan in this sphere is evident from the fact that even in 1929-30 the number of individual peasant farms should be diminished by at least 1,500,000. Instead of the bourgeois economists' prophecies anent the prospect of an annual increase in the number of individual peasant farms by 1,000,000, and the prospect of the further disintegration of the peasant farms, in 1929-30 over 15,000,000 members of the peasant population will be brought into the collective farms. In 1930, instead of the 25% increase foreshadowed in the five-year plan the area sown by Soviet farms will grow by 108%, and instead of the 82% foreshadowed in the five-year plan the area sown by collective farms will increase by 182%. So enormous is the extent of collectivisation of agriculture which is anticipated in the plan for 1929-30.

Side by side with these rates of increase in the collective farms 1929-30 should see their further enlargement per unit. In 1929-30 large-scale collective farms will constitute 15.5% of the total of such farms. This 15.5% of large-scale farms will have 22.3% of the total sown area of all the collective farms, 68.5% of all the tractors, and will yield the State about 30% of the total commodity grain. These large-scale collective farms represent just as large grain factories as are the Soviet farms.

1929-30 is to see a further increase in the percentage of husbandry components socialised in the collective farms by comparison with 1928-29. This increase should be as follows: sowings from 51% to 76%, horses from 25% to 55%, cows from 14% to 50%, sheep from 20% to 41%, pigs from 20% to 40%, and farm buildings from 32% to 40%.

In addition to the increase of Soviet and collective farms adopted in the plan, in 1929-30 over 100 machinery and tractor stations will be organised and at work, with potentialities of cultivating 2,000,000 hectares. In the 1930 spring sowing campaign these stations should sow about 500,000 hectares.

Summarising the results characterising the specific proportion of the socialised sector in

agriculture, we get : in 1930 about 20,000,000 hectares will be brought under socialised cultivation as against the approximately 5,000,000 hectares of last year. The socialised sector will provide about 50% of the commodity grain (of the village balance). The proletarian State will receive over 6,500,000 tons of commodity grain from the Soviet and collective farms in 1930. This is a strong basis for socialist construction. It easily provides against all the manœuvres of the kulak and firmly ensures an uninterrupted satisfaction of the needs of the workers and the army in grain. And this provides a strong basis for the further vigorous increase of agriculture in Soviet Russia.

Despite this vigorous increase in the socialised sector of agriculture, the individual poor and middle peasant farm still occupies a considerable specific proportion in the production of the commodity grain necessary to the State. The help which the State provides to the individual poor and middle peasant farms has of recent years acquired a growingly productive character. This has particular application to the plan for 1929-30. The plan indicates that agricultural co-operation should embrace 16,500,000 farms in 1929-30 as against the 11,800,000 farms of last year ; i.e., there is to be an increase by 28.5% over last year and agricultural co-operation is to embrace up to 63% of all the peasant farms.

The area affected by contracts for grain is to be extended to 46,000,000 hectares in 1929-30 as against the 20,000,000 hectares of last year, and this will ensure that the specific proportion of contracted area to the total area of grain harvest will reach 43%. The area affected by contracts for technical plants is to increase from 3,300,000 hectares in 1928-29 to 5,500,000 hectares in 1929-30, whilst the specific proportion of contracted area to the total area under technical plants will rise from 65% to 85%. The plan also proposes contracting for vegetable and fruit to an area of 900,000 hectares in 1929-30. Such are the dimensions of co-operation and contracting for agricultural production adopted in the plan for the second of the five years. Such is the character and such are the dimensions of the agricultural assistance which will be afforded by the proletariat State in 1929-30 to assist the individual poor and middle peasant farms.

#### THE PROCESSES OF SOCIALISATION.

The vigorous growth of the national economy of the Union and the high rates of industrialisation of the country are organically connected with the modification of class relationships in the country, and with the exceptionally swift growth of the socialist sector of national economy. The material and technical basis and the high degree of organisation of the socialised sector of economy has led to a position where in 1928-29 this sector not only played the leading role in economy, but is reconstructing all national economy on socialistic bases. This role played by the socialised sector is to be carried still farther in 1929-30. We have already spoken of the exceptionally high rates of increase in the socialised sector in agriculture, i.e., in that sphere of economy in which the specific importance of the socialised sector was very small until quite recently. We have also indicated the rates of increase of the socialised sector in the basic funds of the country. We shall only cite a few general features witnessing to the specific importance of the socialised sector of economy in the plan for 1929-30.

In 1929-30 the socialised sector will employ 25% of the total of occupied persons, and over 50% of the gross production of national economy ; whilst it will produce 99.3% of the gross production of census industry, over 75% of the commodity production of all economy, 85% of the wage labour, 96.7% of the trading and middleman turnover, about 60% of all the basic funds of the country and over 75% of the capital investments.

Such are the chief figures summarising the economic might of the socialised sector of national economy of the Soviet Union. Such is the specific importance of that sector which is most completely subjected to the influence of the plan basis in the U.S.S.R. These figures, in conjunction with the exceptional activity which we possess in the working-class and the poor and middle peasants, are a guarantee of the gigantic plan for 1929-30 being accomplished in its entirety.

#### THE FINANCIAL PLAN.

In the five-year plan it was pointed out that in order to carry through all the enormous programme of socialistic construction which was provided for in that plan, financial resources to

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the extent of 86,000,000,000 roubles were required in the course of the five years. In order to realise such a programme in the last year of the five-year plan, it was necessary to mobilise about half of the entire national income through the financial plan.

Hardly any figure of the five-year plan was subjected to so frantic an attack on the part of our class enemies at home and abroad as was this one of 86,000,000,000 roubles. With all the scientific precision of which the bourgeois economists are capable it was demonstrated that it was just this figure, which regulated the entire plan, which was a summary testimony to the fact that the whole five-year plan was at the very least unreal and unattainable.

In one respect these bourgeois economists were right. Capitalist economy never knew such rates of development and never will know them. But the bourgeois economists have no understanding of the advantages to the rates of increase of economy conferred by the proletarian dictatorship and the planned direction of economy, or if they do happen to have learnt anything from the experience of the Soviet Union it is not in the interests of capitalism to mention it.

So many of the prophecies of our enemies concerning the Soviet Union have failed to materialise. And this latest prophecy has also failed. Once more we shall demonstrate this fact with figures.

The financial plan for 1929-30 amounts to a sum of 17,600,000,000 roubles, or over 50% of the total national income ; i.e., even in the second year of the five-year plan it has proved possible to mobilise through the financial plan a share of the national income greater than was proposed for the last year of the five-year plan, whilst the absolute dimensions of the financial plan for 1929-30 considerably surpass the proposals of the five-year plan. According to the control figures the State budget for 1929-30 amounts to a sum of 11,400,000,000 roubles, as against the 9,200,000,000 roubles anticipated in the five-year plan.

The distribution according to assignments of the colossal sum of the financial plan for the second year is also extremely indicative. Of the total sum of 17,600,000,000 roubles, 12,000,000,000 are directed to the needs of economic constructions, 3,800,000,000 are directed to social and

cultural needs, and only 1,700,000,000 to administrative expenses.

Such are the chief features of the national economic plan for 1929-30. Such are the enormous dimensions of the socialistic construction in Soviet Russia. The accomplishment of this task confronts us with a number of fresh gigantic problems, on whose sound resolution depends the execution of the plan, and the rates at which we shall move onward. First place among these problems is occupied by the problem of cadres. The approximate figures of our needs in qualified cadres (engineers and technical staffs) during the coming five years show that in order to accomplish the five-year plan we need to quadruple the number of qualified cadres now at work. For 1929-30 alone our need of qualified workers is provisionally fixed as being for all national economy (excluding transport) in engineers : about 11,000 ; in technical staffs, over 18,000 ; in qualified workers, about 225,000. Agriculture has need of 1,600 engineers, about 10,000 agricultural specialists and instructors, about 7,000 technical staff, over 7,000 average agrarian personnel, over 40,000 tractor hands and drivers, about 100,000 qualified workers, and about 25,000 trained directors of collective farms. Transport requires 2,100 engineers, and 5,100 technical staff. Such are our needs. The exploitation of the old qualified staffs is another great problem. The intensified class war in the country cannot but have its reflection among the technical intelligentsia. Last year showed that part of the old technical intelligentsia were actually, under the mask of honest service of the working-class, engaged in injuring the work. The resolute measures adopted by the Soviet Government against these noxious elements, in conjunction with the fact of a severe intensification of the class struggle in the country and the necessity of every Soviet worker giving a very explicit reply to the question whether he is for us or against us, evoked new processes of disintegration among the old technical intelligentsia. In the last resort these processes should lead to a certain group splitting away from the old technical intelligentsia who have been working with us of recent years, and passing over to our enemies. But the main mass of technical intelligentsia will once more ponder, weigh and link up their personal fate with the fate of the

proletarian dictatorship in Soviet Russia, with the fate of the world socialist revolution. Treachery on the part of the old technical intelligentsia is not excluded in the future. But we think that the number of such betrayals will grow less and less, meeting always with the most resolute resistance among the old technical intelligentsia themselves.

None the less, this is only part of the problem of cadres, and indeed not the chief part at the present time. The chief thing now is the training of new proletarian cadres. Only proletarian cadres can prove a dependable basis for socialistic construction in Soviet Russia. We need workers, armed with all the achievements of bourgeois science and technique, and able in their own way, in the workers' way, to apply this knowledge to the work of socialistic construction in Soviet Russia. So far we are still without the requisite attitude to the question of training new cadres on the part of the organs practically occupied with this work. Here we must have a radical change. The work of training new proletarian cadres must be brought to the forefront of our socialist structure. We may hope that the decision taken by the C.C. November Plenum will provide the necessary change.

The second of the problems on which hang the speed and the fulfilment of the plan, is that of transport. The transport difficulties this autumn bear many signs of being caused by elemental factors such as the peculiar geography of this year's harvest, and are in great measure the result of organisational weaknesses in our work. But in addition to this, the transport difficulties undoubtedly indicate that if we do not apply close attention to it, transport may become one of the weak spots in national economy. Hitherto we have been occupied so far as transport is concerned chiefly with rationalisation activity and chiefly with railway transport. We are only now approaching the problems of transport reconstruction and in particular the reconstruction of railway transport. There should be a radical reconstruction of all the transport in Soviet Russia during the coming year 1930-31.

The third problem is that of reconstructing the organised forms and methods of administration of the country's national economy. The existing methods and forms have too many of

the features of the restoration period. They are growingly constrictive in a period of radical reconstruction of economy. They can become a brake on the work of reconstructing national economy. The reorganisation of the system of industrial administration now being carried out is of itself exceptionally important and necessary; the creation of an All-Union People's Commissariat of Land is only part of the enormous work for the reorganisation of the system of administration of all national economy now imminent.

A detailed analysis of the results of the first year of the five-year plan and the plan for the second year shows that the slogan flung out by the leading section of the working-class of the Soviet Union : to accomplish the five-year plan in four years, is a slogan reflecting our real possibilities. The five-year plan can and will be accomplished in four years, and in certain respects in less than four. The guarantee of this is the exceptional activity of the working masses and the poor and middle peasantry in carrying out the five-year plan. The five-year plan has created a wave of enthusiasm and therein lies the secret of the astonishing, the historically unprecedented rates of increase of Soviet economy.

Everywhere in this article we have adduced the figures adopted by the higher party and Soviet organs in the general national economic plan for 1929-30. Nevertheless, even now, at the very beginning of the year, in the course of operations the possibility and the necessity has been disclosed of setting tasks in a number of spheres which shall surpass even these plan proposals. Thus, for instance, the intensified construction of tractor works and agricultural machinery works in connection with the growth in the socialised sector of agriculture, which is exceeding the most daring of plans, has led to the final plan of capital investments in planned industry amounting to 3,580,000,000 roubles as against the 3,423,000,000 roubles specified in the control figures. The sown area of the Soviet farms has been finally fixed at 4,000,000 hectares as against the 3,300,000 hectares laid down in the control figures. Finally, the vigorous increase of the collective farms, the fact that whole regions and republics have passed over *en masse* to collectivisation, has led to the summary of the latest plans from the localities

showing a figure of 30,000,000 hectares for the year's plan of sown area in the collective farms, which is twice as much as the figure adopted in the plan.

All this witnesses to the fact that, despite all the intensity of the plan, despite all the enormous dimensions of the work proposed by the plan, this enormous plan for 1929-30 will be not only accomplished, but surpassed.

The plan for 1929-30 is one which entails a further intensification of the class struggle in Soviet Russia. This intensification is an absolutely inevitable stage in our work for the construction of a socialist society in the U.S.S.R. This, our ultimate goal, is emerging ever more and more clearly above the forests of our everyday structures.

## The End of Mr. Roy (The Ideological Metamorphosis of a Renegade)

By G. Safarov

### I. A DISCREDITED SYMBOL.

**A**T the second congress of the Communist International Roy was welcomed as the representative of the Indian Revolution. It was clear to everybody that the Indian revolution must seek its road to Moscow, could not but seek it. Roy was not asked for his formal mandate. He came over to the Comintern from petty bourgeois nationalism. When in the Congress Colonial Commission Roy attacked Lenin from the "left," foaming at the throat and arguing that the sole revolutionary force in India could only be the proletariat, that India was on the threshold of a proletarian revolution, Vladimir Ilyitch showed him the greatest of forbearance, seeing in him the expression of the revolutionary mood of the Indian masses.

And now Roy is offering pages of his memoirs for sale. Lenin "valued" him and after Lenin the "Communist International" was never able to value him at his true worth."

Roy was accepted into the ranks of the International Workers as a "mass-man," as the expression of the revolutionary protest of the Indian masses against imperialism. He was given a political baptism, and a name, a pseudonym, that he might stand for the masses which had still to grow up, to rise and develop, to mature into a conscious revolutionary force. He was told: "You have come to us in the name of the newborn Indian revolution. Study in the school of revolu-

tionary struggle, that you may not betray the trust of those who sent you, that you may not betray the trust of the international working class."

And so Roy was accepted in the Comintern. He has now been thrown out—not too soon. Never having succeeded in mastering Leninism—the revolutionary method of Marxism—he could never succeed in coming together with the mass revolutionary and proletarian movement in India. Moreover, he placed an infinite distance between himself and that movement. A revolutionary working class was born in India, but Roy, who had impotently called for its arrival, cannot now find a common language with it. Instead of the symbol which has not justified the trust in it, a new, young, militant class has arrived. And the symbol is tormented with impotent anger. And listen now to the bankrupt and renegade: he knows all the declensions of the "masses": For the masses, to the masses, by, with or from the masses. But it is all paper talk, paper sighs. The Chinese have a custom, when burying the dead, of throwing scraps of paper all along the road which the procession has to follow, these scraps of paper having to represent money. They bribe the evil spirits with money in order that they should not carry away the soul of the dead man on his way to the grave. Mr. Roy is burying himself with all the Chinese ceremonial, scattering Menshevik objurgations around in order to save his own "Communist" soul. An unmasked and discredited symbol is comical. Neither

the Indian workers nor the International proletariat will spare a sigh for him. The wave of revolution brought him for a time into the Comintern, but he has crawled back to the bourgeois-democratic conventionally Menshevik "thinkers." The heavy marches of the proletarian revolution were too much for his strength. He has become a renegade to both the Indian proletariat and the Indian national revolution.

On the question of the fate of the Indian revolution, Roy has for a number of years, beginning with the Second Congress of the Comintern, defended the viewpoint of "left-wing Communism," denying the independent revolutionary rôle of the peasantry in the colonial revolution and making it all a matter of a proletarian revolution. He did not see, he did not wish to see anyone else in the arena of struggle of social forces except the local bourgeoisie, always ready for a treacherous accommodation with imperialism, and the proletariat. Right down to the Fourth Congress he always adopted this attitude. He did not understand the basic feature in the Leninist view of the peasantry and its attitude to the proletariat. As soon as it appeared to him that the revolutionary flood had been replaced by an ebb he swung a complete 180 degrees in the opposite direction, putting all his hopes in bourgeois progress, in the Kuomintang road, and finally in the theory of decolonisation. His "left-wingism" was purely circumstantial and consequently a "left-wing" expression of a suburbanly restricted approach to the tasks of the colonial revolution. He carried the renegade in his "ultra-left" soul just as did the same Wijnkoop, who was his closest rival in the attack on Lenin at the Second Congress. The superficial and shop-window clothing dropped away when difficulties came.

## 2. A KUOMINTANG ESTIMATE OF THE INDIAN REVOLUTION.

Be realists! A sober call to self-knowledge! Com. Richard on the question of the crisis of International Communism! You see, dear reader, that Mr. Roy has entered society with a genuinely right-opportunist jazz-band. The more the better. How would

it be possible, without the aid of this deafening music to prove that in the first place the May Day dealings with the Berlin workers were the fault not of Zoergiebel, but the Comintern; that secondly the partisan struggle in China against the bloody executioner generals is in contradiction to Marxism; thirdly, that in India there is a failure to estimate the revolutionary talent of the bourgeoisie? It is the last point that touches Roy most to the quick, of course.

"The tactics in India also do not take into account the given reality. They are conditioned by a reaction to the defeat in China; the offensive shadow of Trotskyism has fallen upon them. We have burnt our fingers in China, and so we want to do without fire altogether in India. Only yesterday every Indian, no matter what his birth, was a revolutionary nationalist. Our objection that it was necessary to differentiate in our approach to the various masses of which the nationalist movement is composed, was rejected as a 'revision' of Leninism. But now to-day everybody except the proletariat and the peasantry is counter-revolutionary. The Communists must lead the working class against the united counter-revolutionary front, which, according to this theory, extends from the British Viceroy to the petty bourgeois nationalist who threw a bomb into the national Assembly as a sign of protest against oppression. The Swarajist bourgeoisie, only yesterday, still exalted by these same theoreticians for their revolutionary quality, are to-day flung into one heap together with imperialism as the enemy of the Indian masses. That is difficult to believe, but none the less it is true, unfortunately it is true. A continual modification of tactics is necessary in a revolutionary struggle. The rôle of a class which is not revolutionary by its nature must change in the course of development of a movement. But that change has not yet occurred in India. Yet our tactics have been radically modified. Errors were committed in China and never corrected, and in India new errors have been committed on the basis of the new tactics, which are based on the experience of the Chinese situation and are as applicable to the modern situation in India as is a bruise to an

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eye." *Volksrecht*, No. 20, 17th May, 1929.

Mr. Roy is inexpressibly angry. He rends and tramples on the caricature he has himself created and pummels away at the stuffed dummy used to teach raw recruits bayonet exercise.

In his capacity as a learned expert on China, Mr. Roy examines the Indian revolution. This forces us to turn our attention to Mr. Roy's conduct in China. What lessons did he draw from the first phase of development of the Chinese revolution? They are printed in his collection of articles and materials which without any mock modesty he entitled *The Chinese Revolution and the Communist International*. But we will not stop to cavil at a man on such a point! Mock modesty is not part of his nature. Remember only how he despised it at the most tragic stage of the Chinese revolution! "The time has come to separate the sheep from the goats," he declared (15th June, 1927.) "We must know and we must act so that the masses should know who is against the national revolution and who for it. The programme of national revolution which I propose can serve as such a criterion. The classes, parties or individuals who do not accept that programme, who will not wage a revolutionary struggle on its basis, cannot longer regard themselves as adherents of the national revolution." (p. 181 of "*The Chinese Revolution . . .*" etc.)

How did Roy distort the Comintern line in China, apart from his distortion of that line through his attacks of megalomania?

"Although at the present stage the proletariat is directing the revolution in conjunction [!] with the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, at the same time it provides a guarantee that the dictatorship will not lose its character. The proletariat is the kernel, the centre of this bloc, and the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry are the two wings. The proletariat is the class exploited wholly and completely. Consequently it consciously and objectively [?] struggles for Socialism. But among the other two classes the rudiments [oh!] of private property still exist, i.e., the rudiments of future capitalism. These two classes will only completely unite with the proletariat's struggle

for Socialism when these rudiments of private property are destroyed. The task of the dictatorship [this bourgeois-democratic one!] is to destroy these rudiments within the bloc." (*Ibid.* p. 82.)

Now it is clear. The rudiments of private property are to be destroyed within the Kuomintang, in the process of realising a bourgeois-democratic dictatorship. Roy did not understand the class struggle for the hegemony of the proletariat in the Chinese revolution, he did not understand the class struggle within and around the Kuomintang. He did not understand because he has no general understanding of what such a class struggle is and whence it arises. In another part of the same book in which he analyses, in the words of the unfortunate manifesto of the Chinese C.P.s Fifth Congress, how the "gigantic wave of the movement drew the bourgeoisie also after it," he adds that "given such a social basis to the national movement the class antagonisms could not disappear (?) in their entirety." (*Ibid.* p. 123.) To Roy "classes" are not social economic conceptions, are not economic realities, but political conceptions, or to put it better, one-sidedly opportunist political fictions. They are not linked up with one another through class antagonisms and the class struggle.

Such an emasculation of the objective economic basis of the class struggle is characteristic of the bourgeois democrats. They can operate and juggle with Marxist terminology. They cannot exploit the Marxist methodology in the interests of the proletariat's class struggle. The "coalition" speeches of the Tseretellis and Martovs in Marxist "style" in 1917, following on the exercises of the Kautskys and Bauers, were entirely constructed on an emasculation of the objective content of the class concept and the class struggle concept. In order to reconcile the classes one must "trim the rough edges" of class disintegration and the class struggle. That is their logic.

And for Roy the idea of proletarian hegemony has remained a book sealed with seven seals, and will so remain to the end of his days.

In vain does he upbraid the Comintern with Trotskyism. For the Trotskyist theory of permanent revolution, to which he paid unconscious tribute in his dispute with Lenin at the Second Congress, is based on just this very failure to understand the idea of the proletarian hegemony in the revolution. All the course of the Chinese revolution from 1925 to 1927 is a refutation of it in the same measure as it is a refutation of the right-opportunist attempts to transform the Chinese C.P. into the tail of the Kuomintang.

Roy offers a truly idealist estimate of the Indian revolution on the basis that there class antagonisms mature more swiftly, develop more severely than one is accustomed to think in a "good" Brandlerite society, in which the third period of the historical crisis of capitalism is in general regarded as an abominable invention, dictated by an ebullient phantasy. In specifying his proofs of the "Comintern crisis," the renegade Roy has by no means accidentally come to defend the most miserable of all the attacks on the Chinese C.P. "The Communist Party, which in the revolutionary years of 1925/27 were completely masters of the situation, are incapable of organising even the smallest mass demonstration against the anti-Russian activities of the national bourgeoisie acting as the direct instrument of imperialism. Certainly that is not to the great honour of a party which two years ago was the chosen leader of two-and-a-half million organised workers and almost nine million organised peasants. (*Gegen den Strom*, No. 39, 28th Sept., 1929.) The counter-revolutionary liberal cannot see the growth of an illegal and hunted Communist Party, carrying on a struggle under most difficult conditions with its own Roys. The counter-revolutionary liberal prefers a bloc with the counter-revolution at Chang-Sha, with the machinations of Tang-Shen-She, etc., to the Canton Commune, the heroic struggle of Pang-Bai, the underground struggle and revolutionary demonstrations. And he would like the Indian revolution to take the same road. For the Indian bourgeoisie have "not yet matured" for the counter-revolution, yet there is already great haste to "accuse" it of having done so. So

Roy judges, slavishly imitating the Tsertellis and Dans of 1917, who sought for the truth somewhere between the Kornilovs and Tereshchenkos. "It's only a baby yet"! None the less this "baby" has long since taken the road of accommodations with the "Labour Government" under the old "dominion" firm, and only the further growth of a revolutionary mass, and first and foremost of a workers' movement can smash this accommodation. Roy weeps over the "mis-estimation" of the Swarajists, and lauds their left-wing gestures against the persecution of Communists, the Meerut trial, and so on as noble outbursts of soul. On the basis of the Comintern tactics, Roy snivels, "we must revile the revolutionary ally as a provocateur." (*Volksrecht*, No. 24, June, 1929.)

But just one moment, beloved! You have noticed the suspicious-looking "League of Independence," you have observed its indelicate treatment of the bourgeoisie, but you don't trouble to note that the working class of India, in the persons of the Bombay, Jamshedpur, and Calcutta strikers, in the persons of the Girni Kamgar, and so on, are reacting on the whole political situation in the country, are accelerating the differentiation of all the warring forces. You have not observed that at the present stage, the struggle for proletarian leadership of the developing revolutionary rise is concentrated on the unmasking of the "left-wing" disguise of the Indian National Congress. With the aid of this "left-wing" disguise the bourgeoisie is trying to keep the revolutionising stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, the students, the urban population, the peasantry under its own influence. The chief struggle is being waged on this section of the battle-field. But what is the use of explaining this to Roy when with all the obstinacy of a mule he brays that "The various social classes, taken together, constitute the strength of the bourgeois democratic revolution. The alliance of these classes is consequently necessary to the development of the revolution." (*Ibid.*) With the aid of the coalition ideas of Menshevism, it is impossible to understand the tasks of proletarian hegemony in a bourgeois-democratic revolution.

### 3. A COMINTERN CRISIS OR A CRISIS OF A MENSHEVIK PHILISTINE?

The proletariat underestimates its enemies, not only in regard to their strength, but in regard to their benevolent deeds, and overestimates its own possibilities. Hence we have a crisis in the Comintern. That is, truthfully speaking, the matter has gone much farther. "The First International went to pieces over the conflict between Marxism and anarchism. We have just heard the echo of that conflict inside the Communist International. The policy of the present Comintern leadership is a reverberation from anarchism." (*Gegen den Strom, 28th Sept.*) It is not Paul Axelrod or the emigrant blackguard Stanislav Ivanovitch, but M. N. Roy, who is still indisposed to declare himself what he really is. The Mensheviks, "departing" from anarchism, which breaks up all the basis of Statism and civilisation, very quickly arrived at intervention. Roy appeals for self-knowledge in a spirit of advertisement. But you cannot separate the words from the music; in his view the Comintern are behaving like anarchists in regard to Zoergiebel, and in regard to Gandhi, and in regard to the Kuomintang. Worse than that, by attacking MacDonald and dear Miss Bondfield, they do not take the will of the masses into account. The present Comintern leadership is sticking to their erroneous conviction that the success of the revolution does not depend on the will of the masses, but on the determination of a small minority, welded by political backwardness and mechanical discipline. (*Ibid.*)

The late Martov wrote of these matters much more interestingly from the literary point of view. Mr. Roy is wearing out cast-off clothing. He is a Philistine to such an extent that he cannot remain even at the position of conventional "leftism" adopted by the heroes of the utterly forgotten 2½ International. "But it is a very unpleasant fact," he writes, "that the masses are still living under illusions concerning the nature of the Labour Government. The Communist Party ought to explain its real essence in their propaganda. But the injurious illusions will be overcome only through bitter experience.. Consequently the party (the British party) has gone against the will of the masses in adopt-

ing a view that practically involves hostility to the Labour Government." (*Gegen den Strom, No. 23, for 8th June, 1929.*)

The "democrat" Roy justifies his dragging at the tail by references to the will of the masses, which you cannot deny voted for the Labour Government. Roy covers his renegadism by frenzied attacks on "ebullient" tactics. But he will not delude anyone as to the real nature of his intentions. In his own miserable person, which has lost all equilibrium, he demonstrates the very elementary truth that when social-democracy is transformed into social-fascism and its "left flank" into the most miserable section of that social-fascism, then the "right-wing" deserters from the ranks of International Communism inevitably become the hirelings and agents of social-fascism. This happens with all deserters, whether right or left-wing, of the type of Urbans, Trotsky, etc.

Roy is so confident of the social-democratic schoolboy crib, and that not even in the old-fashioned edition of Martov, but in the modern edition by Zoergiebel, that he follows up his accusations of anarchism and anti-democratism against the Comintern with accusations of terrorism and blind subjection to Moscow. It is amazing to see how much this man, who has received lessons even from the greatest leader of the working class, from Lenin, has remained organically inimical to the proletarian revolution. As soon as a new wave of revolution began to rise, as soon as he was given to understand that he must speed up his steps in order to keep pace with international Communism, all the superficial verbal trimmings dropped from him and he began to talk in the language of a mortal suburban terrified by revolution. "If the internal terror," Mr. Roy vociferates on the Brandlerite platform, "is injurious to a party which has found itself in power in conditions of an economic backwardness, where the dictatorship of the proletariat has to hold on through a long period of post-revolutionary (!) struggle of classes, it is still more dangerous to a party only now called to mobilise the masses for the forthcoming struggle. Despite all this all sections of the Comintern are internally dominated by a régime of real terror. Terror is a permissible instrument in the

hands of a revolutionary class in power. The fact that one of the sections of the Comintern has come to power has created a ludicrous psychology throughout the International. The present leaders of the Comintern and of all its sections act as if they were in power and bask in the sunlight of the Russian party." (*Gegen den Strom*, No. 46, for 16th Nov., 1929.) Martov, grieving at the success of world Bolshevism, did at least endeavour to explain the extension of Bolshevik methods to the West as being *inter alia* the result of an intensification of the ruthlessness of the class struggle. We recall this not in order to "speak fair" of this mischievously impotent leader of Menshevism, but in order to reveal the extent of the fall of the renegade Roy. He wants Martov to take an encore. The ideological irreconcilability of Bolshevism is for him not in the least an indispensable and obligatory consequence of the great intensification of the class struggle in our present epoch, it is not a demand for an iron leadership of the mass struggle on a world-historical scale. He compares this ideological irreconcilability to terror applied against enemies of the proletarian dictatorship and Socialistic construction, he flings down the party and State in one heap. Psychologically he is right: he has so completely broken with the Comintern and the October revolution that to the land of proletarian dictatorship he is a white emigré, together with the *Socialistic Courier*, together with the successors of Martov. How does Roy justify his rejection of ideological irreconcilability and party discipline? "By its nature," he writes, "the proletariat is the most homogeneous social class. The disagreements which break out inside the party from time to time in the course of the struggle for power or in order to maintain power, are consequently not irreconcilable disagreements, as they would be in other classes. These classes grow into one another and so create the possibility of the representatives of the interests of one class acting inside the party of another class. But the proletariat is so cleanly divided from all other classes that there is no place in its party for representatives of other classes, with the exception of isolated adventurers or provocateurs. Consequently, disagreements inside

the Communist Party do not represent clashes of hostile class interests. In the very worst case, if the party is in power in such a backward country as Russia, it indirectly reflects the post-revolutionary struggle of classes in the conditions under which the dictatorship of the proletariat is maintained." (*Ibid.*)

Mr. Roy is fond of throwing the jibe of Trotskyism at his opponents. Mr. Roy may be a complete ignoramus, but none the less he must know that the views of the party which he expounds are a free rendering of Mr. Trotsky's work, *Our Political Disagreements*, which appeared a quarter of a century ago in the capacity of an ideological manifesto of Russian Menshevism. Menshevism invariably preached the homogeneity of the working class, together with a defence of a broad Labour Party on British lines, with attacks on the party as an advance guard ideologically monolithic and organisationally consolidated. Mr. Roy is once more wearing cast-off clothing and is so illiterate that he does not even ask himself where social-democracy, with its Zoergiebels, its MacDonalds, its Boncours and Vanderveldes, have come from in face of this absolute homogeneity of the working class. Mr. Roy is a complete, self-confessed Menshevik. That is the essence of the matter. That is why he has such a tender regard for the British Labour Party. To him it is just as equally a creation of the working class as is the C.P.S.U. It has even more right to be representative of the workers than has the C.P.S.U. Let Roy not pretend he has been deprived of the party ticket illegally. Of course there can be no arena for a class struggle inside the Communist Party. But why not? Because the Communist Party is a party of the leading representatives of the proletariat, fused together by ideological irreconcilability in regard to all opportunism; because the party will not allow deviations reflecting bourgeois or petty bourgeois influence on the proletariat to develop in its ranks; because the party—the International Communist Party—throws out the Levis, the Frossards, the Brandlers and Roys in good time. It is by this very quality of irreconcilability that it attracts the working masses to itself. The extrusion of the opportunists serves as a means of getting closer to

the masses. The party as an advance guard is necessary for the realisation of the proletarian hegemony in pre-revolutionary battles and the proletarian dictatorship and Socialist construction in the subsequent period.

Roy is calling together the Lovestones, the Kilboms and the other opportunist refuse. But where are they to meet if not on the platform of Menshevism? Historically, it is impossible to think out an original platform outside those which have been worked out by the class struggle. Mr. Roy proves that every time he puts pen to paper, for all his writings are littered with the lumber of decaying Menshevik ideas.

#### 4. A JOURNEY FROM MOSCOW TO LONDON

"Without in the least depreciating the brilliant achievements of the Bolshevik party [you observe the funereal tone Mr. Roy adopts] we must none the less keep in view the fact that the Russian revolution is to be explained by the confluence of a whole series of favourable circumstances. The bourgeoisie was weak, the State machinery was absolutely broken, the ruling class was demoralised by the catastrophic liquidation of the front, the complete disintegration and demoralisation of the army and fleet supplied the revolution with considerable armed forces, and finally the foreign capitalist States were in no state to intervene successfully at once."

You read these lines and your imagination conjures up some emigré grand dame of the ancient régime, putting her handkerchief to her eyes and sobbing: "Ah, poor Russia! Everybody has forgotten her, although they could have saved her."

But no—this is Mr. Roy writing. And so to this hysterical description of the conditions governing the October revolution he hastens to attach a pseudo-Communist tail, which even so Roy does not start to wave at once. "If an experienced, clear-sighted, resolute and intelligently-led party had not appeared on the scene, then despite all the favourable conjuncture of objective circumstances the proletariat would not have succeeded in winning power. But [Ah, that "but." He's not to be caught napping!] it still remains an open question whether the Bolsheviks

would have succeeded in winning power without these favourable conditions. The present leadership of the Comintern underestimates the confluence of circumstances as an indispensable prerequisite of the success of the revolution." (*Gegen den Strom, No. 41, for 12th Oct., 1929.*) Mr. Roy is somewhat inarticulate in explaining what he means, but one can see that by this mysterious "confluence of circumstances" he means famine, plague, the demoralisation of whole peoples, races, in a word: "Ah, poor Russia!"

Mr. Roy took part in the Comintern Second Congress. He will not have forgotten how Lenin replied to one Mr. Crispian, who had indicated that such a revolution as that of October could be accomplished only from despair, whereas the German workers could not renounce the comforts they had already achieved. Lenin said: "If you wish to prepare the workers for dictatorship and talk to them of a 'not too great a worsening' of conditions, you are forgetting the main thing. And that namely, that the Labour aristocracy arose by assisting 'their' bourgeoisie to conquer the whole world by imperialist methods and to strangle that world, so as to guarantee themselves a better wage." (*Second Congress of Comintern, Shorthand Report.*) Even in his capacity as an ideological bourgeois nationalist Mr. Roy should remember that. For that matter the theory of decolonisation has probably put even hatred for great-power imperialism out of his head.

In this case let him remember what Lenin said in 1920, in reference to the Italian reformists' attempts to frighten the workers with blockade in the event of a proletarian victory. "The reformists point out the possibility of a blockade in order to sabotage the revolution, in order to frighten the workers from the revolution, in order to pass on their own panicky, fearsome, irresolute, vacillating, wavering mood to the masses. The revolutionaries and Communists must not deny the dangers and difficulties of the struggle, so as to inspire the masses with greater firmness, so as to cleanse the party of the weak, the vacillating, the wavering." (*Lenin: Hypocritical Speeches on Freedom, 1920.*)

But Mr. Roy doesn't want to know anything about Leninism, which is the mortal

enemy of renegadism. And on his road from Moscow to London, *via* Berlin, he reveals a new Russian defect in the Comintern: "In the exact sense of the word there were 'no Trade Unions' whatever in Tsarist Russia. So long as 'competent' people were at the head of the Comintern, men who had come into contact with the West, the Russian one-sidedness was not fatal. But without these men everything has been turned upside down. Since these old, experienced leaders have departed, either by death or by exclusion from leadership, the view of the Russian party on the Trade Union question has become muddled, and that as the direct result of the difference in character and functions of the Trade Unions of the Soviet Union and those of the West. Hence the theory has been built up that the Trade Unions gradually become a part of the capitalist State machinery. They have not noticed that the functions of Trade Unions under capitalism are quite different from those appertaining to a dictatorship of the proletariat."

"It is quite clear: in Russia the Trade Unions are semi-Statised, and so the Bolsheviks think that the same applies in the West, not understanding that under capitalism Trade Unions are free." (*Gegen den Strom*, No. 41.)

Mr. Roy has slipped into such a Menshevik morass that a quite insufferable odour arises from every word he writes. Of course, he does not see the State arbitration, the alliance between the trade union upper groups, the bourgeois State and the entrepreneurs. After all, that is part of his direct obligation as a renegade learning to be a lackey. He reminds one of the notorious judge in one of Shchedrin's stories, who had two eyes, one asleep and the other awake. With the one he saw nothing, but with the other he saw only trifles.

Roy's sleeping eye is turned towards social-fascism. His vindictively unsleeping eye towards the U.S.S.R. And this second eye sees only Menshevik trivialities.

But we will let Roy speak for himself. No one can compromise him more than he himself does. Roy floridly considers the present situation in the U.S.S.R. and points to the necessity of passing from NEP to something

which has never been before. He lays it down without right of appeal that "in fact the capitalist element in agriculture has of recent years already shaken the foundations of the dictatorship of the proletariat." Capitalism is advancing, and the workers' government is completely non-plussed. This optimist where the Kuomintang and the Indian National Congress are concerned doesn't think our Five-Year Plan is worth a brass farthing. Listen to his profoundly thoughtful explanation. "Whilst agreeing with the principle [!] of the Five-Year Plan and knowing that its achievement demands stern resolution, at the same time one may not underestimate the difficulties standing in the road. For instance, there is a danger of a serious financial crisis, which may develop out of the attempts to establish collective agriculture too fast. Hitherto a very large proportion of the State finances has come from the peasantry, i.e., accumulation has largely taken place in the agricultural sector of national economy. Now the process will be the converse. A very considerable part of the new capital has to be invested in agriculture, if it is indispensable to achieve the swift success of the great agricultural collective farms." (*Ibid.*) Mr. Roy has just as brilliant an understanding of the tasks and conditions of Socialist reconstruction as he has of the nature of the Kuomintang, of the proletarian in the middle and the "rudiments of private property" on each side. His argument against the Five-Year Plan may be compared with the Philistine argument against Socialism that if nobody has his own pocket no one will accumulate and so naturally society will perish.

Mr. Roy has arrived at the Berlin of Zoergiebel and the *Socialistic Courier*. His further route has its destination in London.

It may seem strange that in summarising Mr. Roy's political balance we have ignored his theory of decolonisation, which announces the arrival of a new era in the development of imperialism, an era of voluntary and intensified industrialisation of the colonies. Mr. Roy strove to put an industrial basis under the compromise between the bourgeois leaders of India and British imperialism. In its developed form this theory inevitably led to the renunciation of a revolutionary struggle for

proletarian hegemony in the Indian revolution. But this theory is only one of the metamorphoses of the renegade. He has now so completely defined his own position that the theory of decolonisation has ceased to be the most characteristic vestment of the chameleon.

In his renegadism Roy has discovered himself, has found his real nature, which hitherto he had to hide and suppress, squeezing it into Communist bounds. This is why all his present protest against an enforced past is so strongly marked with calls for "freedom of thought and judgment."

It is difficult for a man of the colonial East to pass straightway to the social-imperialist second international. And that is why Manabendra Nath Roy has so long hidden in the shadow of the Comintern. But the rise of a new wave of colonial revolution in connection with the lessons of China has forced him to say who he is. He has forgotten the road by which he arrived at Moscow, and now, become a renegade of the Comintern, he has become also a renegade of the Indian revolution. Mr. Roy has nothing to do either in Moscow or in India. His place is in London.

## Forward to Bolshevik Mass Work Results of the Plenum of the Young Communist International

By H. Remmele

**T**HE Plenum of the Y.C.I., which was held in Moscow from 15th November to 2nd December was of great importance to the whole Communist Movement as well as to the Young Communist Leagues. The problems which were down on the agenda affect all Communist Parties, the criticism of the work of the Y.C.I., made by the Comintern, is also valid for several of the Parties. The mistakes, defects, vacillations and omissions in the practical task of winning the mass of young workers for Communism, reflect the similar mistakes, defects and inadequacies in the Comintern sections. This makes it imperative for all Communist Parties to study thoroughly the work of the Y.C.I. Plenum and to establish the closest possible relations with the Youth Leagues, for the contact between the Parties and the Leagues has been wholly lacking or only of a very insufficient character. In the final analysis the Parties are really responsible for the Leagues in their respective countries, and the Comintern's criticism of the Y.C.I. is consequently a criticism of the activities of the Parties.

The importance of the Plenum is increased in virtue of the part played to-day by the young workers in relation to the whole working-class. The specific weight of the working youth as part of the whole working-class has increased because

to-day young workers are employed to a proportionately greater extent than formerly in the process of production. The growth of rationalisation in industry and trade exhausts labour power much more quickly than formerly. The Moloch of capital demands the sacrifice of an ever-increasing number of young workers, while the older generation is driven more and more out of the factories. The result of this "rejuvenation" process is that the young workers are coming to play a greater part in the class struggle.

The capitalists are fully aware of the growing importance of young workers in political and social life. The capitalist state, bourgeois parliaments and bourgeois municipalities, which have not a penny to spare for the unemployed, for housing or for raising the workers' falling standard of life, spend hundreds of thousands on the so-called patriotic training of youth, on sports and games, etc., and what cannot be done by money itself is achieved by police reaction, by the censorship, by the prohibition of revolutionary literature and newspapers, by strengthening the influence of religious bodies in the schools, by subjecting the youth to police supervision and compulsory State service—in fact, everything possible is done to direct young workers from the revolutionary class struggle and

to kill any political interest among the young workers. In those countries where there is not enough money to accomplish the required training, where the process of radicalisation is making headway among the young workers despite all the efforts of the bourgeoisie and of the social democrats, the capitalists are striving to divert the pressure of the youth towards political activity into fascist channels. The militarist fascist organisations, which have in recent months shown increasing vitality, carry on their recruiting work mainly among the young workers. This is the case in Germany, for example, with the "National Socialist Labour Party," which takes all other fascist bodies under its wing and which, merely by its signboard of "Labour Party," makes it clear that its chief job is to win the workers to itself. At the Nürnberg Congress of the National Socialist Labour Party, Hitler declared, not without pride, that 70 per cent. of the members of the defence organisations were under 25 years of age. The experiences of the last elections also showed the great extent to which young people, particularly from clerical and official circles, but also from among working-class circles, take part in the Hitler movement. The fact that this movement has again assumed such considerable dimensions, and has in some countries, such as Austria, developed into the most immediate danger to the entire working-class movement, is not to be attributed, in the final analysis, to the mistakes of the Communist movement. Fascism and social fascism are the counter-revolutionary forces of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary forces of the proletariat, but the fact that fascism can penetrate into the camp and into the actual ranks of the working-class, is better evidence than any other of the deficiencies and defects in the revolutionary movement, in the Communist Parties and Youth Leagues.

The Y.C.I. Plenum remorselessly exposed the disproportion between the continually growing radicalisation process among young workers, and their increasing participation in the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat on the one side, and the weakness in the organisational and training work of the Youth Leagues in the other, the stagnation and indeed the decline in the position of the Communist Leagues. This disproportion, and all that it implied, was subjected to merciless criticism. In the last few

years the Young Communist International has really become a world organisation, with sections in all the five continents. The establishment of Youth Leagues in further Asia, in China, Japan, Korea, in India and Indonesia, the progress of the Leagues in Africa and Asia Minor, the growth of Leagues in Australia and in practically every country of Latin America, points to the certain extension, and development, towards an effective world movement. On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the backwardness of the Leagues in the older capitalist countries, Leagues which can look back to ten years of activity. Of course it is foolish to make simple comparisons between the Young Communist Leagues and the Social Democratic Youth sections. Despite the numerical strength of the social democratic youth organisations in a few capitalist countries, the Social Democratic Youth International is shrinking and becoming in increasing extent nothing but an appendage of the national bourgeois movements in the various countries.

The fact that reformism, in a number of capitalist countries, still attracts a large number of young workers, in several cases more than the Young Communist Leagues, demonstrates, no less than other facts do, how great are the tasks which confront the Leagues. On the basis of these facts, the Y.C.I. in its self-criticism, quite openly discussed the political and organisational crises in several of the Leagues, such as those in Czecho-Slovakia, England, Norway and Austria. It was stated that since the Y.C.I. Congress in September, 1928, these Leagues have on the average suffered a 20 per cent. decrease in membership. The Plenum declared with great emphasis that the chief causes of the unsatisfactory situation of the Y.C.I. are to be found in the sectarian character of the Y.C.I. organisations, in the separation of the Leagues from the mass of young workers. Despite the decisions of the Fifth Congress, the Leagues have been incapable of instituting broad mass work, of taking the road towards the winning of the masses. In almost all countries our Youth Leagues have not come out as the leaders of the young workers, have not pointed out the road and the goal in regard to their most elementary needs and most immediate interests. In most Leagues there is a certain fear of the masses. The presence of organisational defects, political

passivity and the tendency towards empty and meaningless sectarianism has created an ideology in which petty bourgeois and radical phrases replace revolutionary action.

It is true of many countries that strikes of young workers, their participation in the mass struggles of the proletariat, have taken place without any action on the part of the Communist Leagues, often even without any knowledge that they were taking place. While our Youth Leagues concerned themselves deeply and with great self-satisfaction, about great world political problems, isolating themselves from the real and pulsing life of the proletariat, the really revolutionary life among the young workers passed by untouched and unnoticed by the Leagues.

It is characteristic of the real position in most of the Leagues that factory groups are extremely weak and exist mainly in small factories, where the Leagues have some footing, while the task of winning the young workers in the large factories has in no case been accomplished satisfactorily. Area groups, and not factory groups, is the predominating form of organisation in the Y.C.I. Leagues at the present time; this inevitably leads to a petty-bourgeois social atmosphere which, wholly dissociated from any mass activity, opens the way to a sectarian spirit, particularly among politically untrained young workers. The necessary result is that really serious, persevering and constant work in those organisations in which young workers take an active part, such as the trade unions, sports and cultural bodies, etc., is scarcely ever undertaken. Similarly systematic work in hostile organisations of a reformist, religious or fascist character, in company sports associations and bourgeois sports associations, has been greatly neglected in comparison with earlier times. The excellent traditions of the Communist Youth Leagues in anti-militarist work, in the effort to disintegrate imperialist armies, which were excellently maintained in France some years ago, seem to have fallen into oblivion, and work in this sphere at the present time has undeniably arrived at a standstill.

In so far as mass work has been carried out in several of the Leagues, it has been of a more or less sporadic character which, it is true, has brought numbers of young workers into the Leagues, but whose effects have been nullified by defective political and organisational work,

so that the fluctuations, which are very extensive in many of the Leagues, has a bad effect on the entire Communist Youth Movement. In other instances, where the masses have really been drawn into the movement, the growth was of an external character which brought no enduring strength and increase to the movement. Mistakes and defects in the leadership of the Leagues which have the same effects, consist in a sort of inelastic bureaucratism, which assumes a certain pattern, that of mechanically imitating, without reflection, Party slogans and Party circulars, no regard being paid to the peculiar conditions of young workers. Instead of living contact between leadership and membership and the young workers, there is a tiring flood of circulars, a mass of material without any contact with the masses, because a really active life, maintained by correct and appropriate methods of work, does not exist.

Besides this general lack of practical activity, there exists in many Leagues an ideology which must be considered as the particular characteristic of the sectarian spirit. This is shown most obviously in "vanguard-ism," in the idea that the Young Communist Leagues, as the "elite" of Bolshevism, should consist solely of the "purest and clearest, the most active heads," which, in accordance with their position, are called upon to act as arbitrators over the Parties themselves. The article of comrades Schatzkin and Sten in the Moscow *Young Communist Pravda*, in which these theories, with all their petty bourgeois implications drawn from the experiences of young workers are clearly put forward, is well known. Less well known are similar attitudes and theories expressed in a number of other Leagues. This has occurred among the leaders of the League in England, Czechoslovakia and to some extent in Poland.

The Y.C.I. Plenum, guided by the Comintern, had to wage a sharp struggle against the petty bourgeois attitude, which involves great dangers for the Communist Leagues. The Plenum declared unambiguously that this ideological peculiarity which is one of the main causes of the Leagues' isolation from the mass of young workers and which degrades the Leagues into sects, lies far "left" of the Leninist-Bolshevik policy of the Comintern. The sterility of this ideology, wholly dissociated from reality, was made clear in the discussion which took place

within the Leagues on the change towards mass work decided upon by the Fifth Congress of the Y.C.I. more than a year ago.

The incapacity both as regards policy and organisation, to carry out the change, was emphasised at the Y.C.I. Plenum discussions. The change, which is in reality nothing but the practical policy of the Comintern and the Communist Parties as applied to the Youth Leagues, was discussed in the majority of Leagues as though it were a secret mystery concerning the most abstract and remote of theories. Instead of carrying out the change, of applying the united front tactics from below, of actually undertaking the work of mobilising the mass of young workers, organised and unorganised, wherever they are to be found, great and fantastic theories were constructed without which it was believed to be impossible to carry out any practical work. Consequently the decisions of the Fifth Y.C.I. Congress remained merely paper resolutions, and none of the results which were hoped for were realised; the Leagues, dissociated from the young workers, failed to establish their position as leaders.

The helplessness in face of this necessity to accomplish the required change was manifested at the Plenum itself. A purely doctrinaire discussion took place on the nature and contents of the change, which gave rise to the most varied theories on this fairly simple question. Differences of opinion arose as to whether the change was or could be interpreted as of an organisational, political, tactical, theoretical, practical, philosophic or economic nature. Those who did at least try to grasp the matter correctly and to deal with the practical carrying out of the decisions of the Congress, such as the German Y.C.L. delegation, were reproached with opportunism and all the other seven deadly sins, on the ground that the conducting of independent strikes of young workers was a form of Chauvinism, and that the change can only be realised if it is thoroughly understood in all its theoretical implications by every member of the League. Until this "purity and clarity" is achieved throughout the Y.C.I. organisations, no steps should be taken towards the practical realisation of the change. The Comintern delegation to the Plenum did succeed in putting an end to this fruitless idea, so estranged from reality, among the Leagues, and in setting them on the

road to the practical realisation of the Fifth Congress decisions.

These scholastic discussions within the Leagues on the unambiguous and obvious task of winning the young workers for Communism, are typical manifestations of the left wing disease. There are also, of course, right wing opportunist deviations due to strong reformist pressure, which are the chief danger. These include in the first place opportunism in practice. By this is meant the use of methods which deceive the workers, decisions which promise much without any serious thought being given to the possibility of putting them into actual practice, agreement with the decisions of higher bodies, while obstacles are put in the way of carrying out those decisions. Equally famous is the ideological struggle of the rights and conciliators against the tactical change in the application of the united front tactics from below, in mass mobilisation for industrial struggles and factory council elections, in drawing the greatest possible number of organised and unorganised workers over to the policy of Communism. This struggle of the right wing places the greatest obstacles in the way of real Bolshevik policy and strategy. However much these obstacles of a right wing opportunist nature weigh down the scale in carrying out the Bolshevik policy of the Communist Parties, in the Youth Leagues they are not the preponderant and dominant causes, which prevent the application of Bolshevik policy and strategy. On the contrary, as the discussion on the change showed, it is ultra-left tendencies which explain the weakness and ineffectiveness in the work and methods of the Leagues.

We must clearly recognise the present position of the Young Communist Leagues. It is noteworthy that it is the Leagues which can look back on a decade of existence in which the period of solely propagandist activity is most distant and which in the past have given examples of real mass movements and mass mobilisation. If it were now the case that opposition groups within the old reformist organisations were developing towards Bolshevism, then in certain circumstances the "circle" system with all its weaknesses, would be understandable and even useful and necessary; but to-day this period has passed for the Leagues

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in the old capitalist countries, and the Leagues are confronted with the task of doing their share in the organisation and preparation of the proletarian revolution by applying their particular methods of work among the young workers. On this point Lenin said :

"So long as the question was, and still is, one of gaining the vanguard of the proletariat for Communism, just so long and so far will propaganda take the first place ; even sectarian circles, with all the imperfections of sectarianism, here give useful and truthful results. But when the question is one of the practical activities of the masses, of the disposition—if it be permissible to use this expression—of armies numbering millions and of the distribution of all the class forces of a given society for the last and decisive fight, here propaganda alone, the mere repetition of the truths of "pure" Communism, will avail nothing. Here one must count by millions and tens of millions, not by thousands as, after all, the propagandist does, the member of a small group that never yet led the masses" (*Left Wing Communism*, p. 73).

The Tenth Comintern Plenum analysed the political situation in European countries in the third period as one which would witness new revolutionary shocks to capitalist world rule. The entire political and tactical activity of the Communist Parties and Youth Leagues must be based upon this situation. "Here one must count by millions, not by thousands." In such a situation we must reach the whole class of the revolution and bring it to support the vanguard. The Communists will be able to fulfil this task only if they have distributed their forces among the masses in such a way that the whole class, every section of it, sees its road and its object clearly and presses forward along the general political and strategical line of struggle mapped out by the vanguard.

The strategical disposition of the forces of the vanguard requires that the Communists should not wait for the masses to come to them ; the shock troops must go among the masses, they must penetrate all mass organisations, all the organisations which the young workers have established on their own initiative, the trade unions, sports associations, the factories and workshops, the schools and recreation grounds ; in fact, everywhere where young workers meet together and are active, the Communist Youth

Leagues must have its propagandists and agitators, the shock troops of the revolutionary vanguard must carry on their work.

The factories, and particularly the large factories, should be covered with a close network of revolutionary contacts among the young workers, reaching every department and workshop. Every district and local must know exactly the number and kind of factories in their respective areas, the number of young workers and apprentices employed, what are the most important factories which must be concentrated on with particular thoroughness, what sympathetic or hostile organisations have won the adherence of the young workers ; they must know everything that is worth knowing if systematic work among the youth is to be carried on effectively. Regular factory meetings of young workers and factory group meetings to draw in sympathisers, should be a constant part of the local plan of work. It must not be of a sporadic or occasional character, but constant and continuous. The members of the League must work in all mass organisations accessible to Communists—and this means all organisations open to young workers—as the finest elements in those bodies ; they must try to get into leading positions of those mass organisations and prove themselves to be the best exponents of solidarity and unity in the organisation concerned. This is the method by which the mass organisations of young workers, or those in which they possess a strong influence, can be turned into bodies sympathetic and helpful to the revolutionary class struggle and to the practical solution of our revolutionary tasks.

To attain this object it is not always necessary for the Leagues to distribute all their members among these most varied organisations. Frequently it is enough for a small number of trained and qualified young Comrades to be sent into them, who will rally to the League capable and willing workers, who should be organised into Communist fractions within the association concerned. Regular meetings of the pioneers of Communism in mass organisations to examine concretely their work and their task of winning the organisations over to help in the work of the Communist Parties and Youth Leagues, must be made part of the daily work of the Leagues. Mass work in the young workers' organisations must be co-ordinated with work

in the factories. If the Leagues take the lead, in all the vital problems which face the young proletariat, showing the way and setting the goal, the Communist Parties will be able to fulfil their task of becoming the leader of the entire working-class.

The position of the Leagues shows that at the present time the application of a correct Bolshevik line is threatened not only by right opportunist dangers, but also by left sectarian deviations towards petty bourgeois doctrinairism, by a sterile ultra-left attitude in putting the revolutionary tasks of the present period into practical operation. These clear manifestations of irresolution and ultra-leftism in the Leagues are also apparent in the Parties, even in some sections of the most advanced Parties of the Comintern. The Communist Parties must therefore subject themselves as well as the Leagues to constant examination and guidance, fighting against right-wing and conciliatory tendencies, which are the chief danger, but also against left-wing tendencies, using the method of the most open self-criticism, in order to assure a correct Bolshevik line in carrying out as effectively as possible our great task of organising and preparing for the proletarian revolution.

In its criticism of the policy and work of the Y.C.I., the Comintern made it quite clear that, both now and in the future, the right danger is the greatest danger threatening the Communist world movement : the right wing is nourished on illusions as to the strength of capitalist mobilisation. Right wing opportunist fluctuations, which will be more frequent in the future, result from the pressure exercised by reformism and by the social democratic Parties on the working-class, in those countries where reformism is still powerful. The same is true of countries at present ruled by the white terror, where the measures of suppression taken against the revolutionary movement results in a retreat to opportunism. As the State power becomes more and more fascist in all countries, right wing opportunist deviations will become more frequent within the Communist Parties. In the third period even the triumph of Bolshevism over the liquidators and conciliators has not disposed of the right danger and of opportunist vacillations ; these arise from objective conditions and will therefore reappear constantly.

This puts on the Parties and on the Comintern the obligation to be continually on the alert, to exercise the strictest control and unfailing self-criticism of all the activities of the Parties. The intensification of the class struggle and the growing war danger give rise to doubts and irresolution among those workers who formerly to some extent believed that they possessed an assured standard of life, and this has its effects within the ranks of the Parties and affords further nourishment for opportunist tendencies. The fight against the right danger within the Communist Parties remains now as before the chief danger in internal Party development.

The present period of transition from the relative stabilisation to the growing crisis of capitalism, with the more and more frequent shocks to the capitalist world system which this entails, shocks which strengthen and broadens the revolutionary forces of the proletariat and compel the bourgeoisie and social-fascism to employ to an increasing extent methods of violence and reaction, is an extremely complicated period, giving rise to a process of regrouping and re-orientation among the working-class. In this period, when both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary tendencies grow to gigantic proportions and come into violent conflict with each other, scientific examination of all the experiences of the revolutionary class struggle is essential if a really revolutionary and correct Bolshevik policy and strategy is to be followed. But internationalism, the fact that the Communist world movement draws upon the experiences gained in the whole course of the history of the proletarian class struggle and particularly upon the triumph of the proletarian revolution in the Soviet Union, the possibility of co-ordinating the several experiences of the Communist Parties with the experiences of the victorious Soviet proletariat, gives the revolutionary vanguard an excellent opportunity of being able to follow a correct Bolshevik policy and strategy.

The Plenum of the Y.C.I. rendered a great service in pointing out that, although in the present period the chief danger arises from right wing and conciliatory tendencies, there exists at the same time a danger of barren left sectarianism. The Plenum declared that the work of the Y.C.I. in view of the great tasks, which confronted it, was wholly unsatisfactory, and offered

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to the sections of the Comintern an excellent example, in so doing, of how to pursue a really Leninist Bolshevik policy. This, indeed, was the greatest service rendered by the Plenum of the E.C. of the Y.C.I.

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It would be incorrect to conclude from the foregoing that recent development in the Y.C.I. sections has only a dark side. The increasingly active participation of young workers in the class struggles of the proletariat also strengthens the political life of the Leagues. We have only to remember that the first attempts to transform our organisations from the area to the factory group basis in 1925-26 even in Germany, where the Party is one of the most advanced sections, met with failure, and the old area group had to be re-established if the League was not to suffer greater harm; this weakness has now been entirely overcome and the German League is one in which the factory group form of organisation has been most successfully established. The position of the Leagues is similar in regard to independent strikes of young workers and apprentices, independent participation in the political struggles of the proletariat and particularly in the revolutionary willingness to carry on and to lead revolutionary struggles, as was shown in the bloody May Days in Berlin, the street fighting in Poland, and the fighting against fascism in Austria. Or let us consider the attitude of the Swedish Y.C.L. towards the split in the Swedish Party, when the League succeeded in maintaining a firm and disciplined hold over all its members, while the Party itself

was shaken, and twelve thousand young Communists became the most reliable support for the Comintern in the fight against the renegades. This showed that the work in the League in recent years has borne a far more Bolshevik character than the work in the Party.

With all the criticism of the work of the Y.C.I. that is necessary, we should by no means ignore the active and satisfactory aspects of that work. Following up the successes which have already been gained, we must continue to Bolshevise the Youth Leagues and to cast off any traces of undesirable manifestations. At the same time we must register a strong protest against the scanty support rendered by practically every section of the Communist International to the Communist Youth Leagues. It was stated at the Plenum, and it was frequently very obvious, that the Parties cared very little, and concerned themselves scarcely at all, for the Leagues. We repeat what was stated earlier in this article:

*In the final analysis the Communist Parties are responsible for the weaknesses and defects, for the mistakes and inadequacies in the Young Communist Leagues.* The Parties must take good care that their policy is realised and carried out in the Leagues. Wherever this is not the case, the Party alone can be made responsible. In the future it will be necessary for the Comintern to attach much greater importance to supervising the activities of the Parties in so far as the Leagues are concerned and to demand from each Party an account of this activity. The further success of the whole Communist movement depends upon this.

# From Manuilsky's Report at the Enlarged Executive of the Young Communist International

**C**OMRADES, the second part of my report will consist of an examination of how far the parties are operating the decisions of the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., or rather, the insufficient determination with which our parties are putting these decisions into force.

I will start with the chief question—one of enormous importance in the development of our work—that of self-criticism. Many comrades regard self-criticism as a kind of Sunday dinner, to be served up on special occasions. Many regard self-criticism as a special episode, a sort of temporary phase in the development of the Communist Parties, to be followed by a period of quiet, untroubled existence for the Central Committees and other leading Committees free from all self-critical torments. There are comrades who think that the question of self-criticism is of Russian origin and bound up exclusively with the situation in the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.S.U. The C.P.S.U. has dealt with its deviations, the country has entered upon a period of reconstruction of its economy, which demands a concentration of energy and the greatest initiative from the masses ; it is not possible to reconstruct national economy on socialist bases without drawing the millions of toilers into this work. Hence arises the slogan of self-criticism in the C.P.S.U. and the U.S.S.R. But in the C.P.s of the capitalist world—these comrades consider—this slogan is something in the nature of an irritant, which only troubles the peace of the governing bodies. Such a conception of self-criticism is totally unsound.

Self-criticism is a normal function of internal party democracy. Without self-criticism there is no internal party democracy, for it is a component part of that democracy. The history of our Party shows that at times we have had to restrict our self-criticism owing to the continued existence of a war situation, when we were compelled to talk the language of machine-guns and cannon to Kolchak and Denikin ; then we did not talk extensively of self-criticism, or internal-party democracy. But in normal times,

and also in a period of development of the revolutionary wave, there is not a single Communist Party—neither that which has already achieved a proletarian dictatorship, nor that which is struggling for that dictatorship—which can develop without self-criticism. Only with the aid of self-criticism can we educate the party membership.

By what other methods shall we raise the deepest strata of the working-class, if we do not teach them to apply a sound line in the struggle, through the most ruthless criticism of the errors of the leadership and of their own errors ? Self-criticism is part of the Tenth Plenum decisions, decisions which cannot be operated without self-criticism. Only with the aid of self-criticism can we wage a successful struggle against the contradiction between word and deed, between mere resolutions and the definite overcoming of opportunism in practice. A contradiction which all sections of the Comintern, and the Young Communist International chiefly, are suffering. But self-criticism has to be applied intelligently, in Bolshevik fashion.

The first condition for the realisation of self-criticism is to have less talking about it and more genuine criticism of our defects and errors. So far, despite the fact that the rise of the workers' movement intensifies the need for self-criticism, we have too many generalities in its application. All the parties are ready to write innumerable theses, declarations, instructions on self-criticism, but there is still extraordinarily little genuine criticism. Here it is worth while to quote Lenin on the question of self-criticism :—

"The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the party, and of how it fulfils in practice its obligations to its class and towards the labouring masses. To admit a mistake openly, to disclose its reasons, to analyse the surroundings which created it, to study attentively the means of correcting it—these are the signs of a serious party, this means the performance of its duties ;

this means educating and training the class, and, subsequently, the masses."—"Left-Wing" Communism, page 41.)

The second condition of self-criticism is that its initiation and development should be taken in hand by the Central Committee of the Party. Otherwise self-criticism will break into an elemental wave.

What has experience revealed hitherto? That this initiation and this direction of self-criticism is in part realised in the converse fashion. I will give you an obvious example of how we should not carry out self-criticism. I am going to speak of the C.P.G.B. At first we had there a self-criticism which went on with extraordinary politeness and decorum, based on all the good parliamentary traditions, without any naming of the opportunists, so as not to give offence to any of the comrades. The themes for self-criticism were chosen by the "innocents" themselves. Thus, for example, the C.C. published its proposal to consider the following questions:—

Is there a basis for social-reformism in our country?

The basis for work in the sphere of the united front, at the factories and in the local organisations.

The political importance of a daily newspaper.

And then unexpectedly there was a violent swing of temperature. The C.C. dropped the reins of self-criticism from its hands, and self-criticism acquired anarchist forms. Instead of raising political questions, it began by considering the question of whom to elect and whom not to elect to the Political Bureau and the C.C. The C.C. must give a businesslike setting to the carrying through of self-criticism. But with that kind of self-criticism the party will not make any improvement in its political line.

The small Dutch party carried through its self-criticism in the following fashion. It was enough for one of the members of the party to write an article in the *Tribune* for the C.C. immediately to write an answer four or five times as long, subjecting this member of the party to a violent attack. And obviously the Dutch comrades "somewhat" mixed up the direction of self-criticism with the question of restraining self-criticism. And these are the very parties which for a number of years have not grown numerically and whose membership has even declined, and which most need a

perfect storm of self-criticism. Here, we need a revolt of the rank and file members of the party against the leaders who for so many years have not taken a single step forward in the work of winning the masses. Such a party needs self-criticism more than any other, for such a party is comparable to a room in which there is no ventilation.

The third condition of self-criticism is that it should be linked up with the establishment of political responsibility from top to bottom.

We have certain parties where the C.C. has not taken a single step towards winning the masses, and it does not enter the head of any member of the party to demand of such a C.C. why the party directed by such a C.C. does not develop. We are carrying on the most stubborn and ruthless class war in the world, one demanding the greatest of conscious responsibility in every "officer" and in every "rank-and-filer," in reality there reigns an absolute unconcern on the question of responsibility. Take the imperialist war which the bourgeoisie is organising: when any general suffers a defeat, he is replaced; but we can lose half the membership of a party and the members of the C.C. remain in their posts. We need a system of political responsibility, when the party will call its leaders to answer for every failure, will place the work of the leading bodies under diligent control, will declare a determined war on all "partnerships" or standing by one another in covering up errors and defects. Without the establishment of such a system of responsibility we shall never have well-tempered Bolshevik parties.

Finally, the fourth condition of self-criticism is that it must be bound up with a genuine will on the part of the party to correct its defects. Thus, for instance, the Belgian C.P. wrote an open letter to all the members of the party, in which it subjected the political line of the party and the methods of its work to a ruthless criticism. But if this letter is not followed by a correction of the errors in practice, by a modification in the methods of work, by a course for the masses in deeds and not in words, if the Belgian party remains at this same dizzy level—I ask you, will there be any benefit as the result of such self-criticism? Such self-criticism will not be beneficial, it will be merely verbal deception, and not self-criticism; such verbal deception will merely demoralise the party, will

cultivate a derisive attitude to the slogan of self-criticism, will accustom it to an irresponsible attitude to the work of the party. Self-criticism is too precious an instrument to exploit it frivolously.

And now I turn to the problems of the Y.C.I.—the most important problems of this Plenum.

If, comrades, there is any organisation where we have been seriously belated with this question of applying self-criticism, then undoubtedly it is the Y.C.I.; and the fault for such a state of things lies at the door not only of the Y.C.I., but of the Communist International also.

I will say quite frankly that hitherto, instead of businesslike assistance to the Y.C.I., we have frequently belauded our youth: you are the flower of the present, the fruit of the future (laughter). You are our red succession, you are our iron battalions. That is the language with which we have been in the habit of addressing our youth. At times our praise of the youth has not been without justification. When you remember the positive role which the Y.C.I. has played throughout the ten years' of its existence, in the struggle with opportunist deviations, it has to be said straight out that in this regard you have earned the greatest support from the Comintern; with your active aid we have cleansed the Communist Parties from opportunism. And now that role is showing itself in Sweden, where the great majority of the Young Communist League is fighting for the Comintern line. We gladly recognise these services on the part of the Y.C.I., but unfortunately we too frequently have failed to see those defects which have developed over years in the work of the Y.C.I. We have left the youth to themselves; the Comintern direction of the Y.C.I. has been very weak; and this is undoubtedly making itself felt in all the sections of the Y.C.I.

I will take such a clear example as the last Congress of the Y.C.L. of France. There was no representative of the Political Bureau at the Congress. He put in an appearance only in order to make a report, which it has to be said far from satisfied the Congress, and then vanished, not intervening even in the discussions, and not making any closing speech. The Congress passed off completely without leadership from the party.

The first conclusion which we have to draw is that such things must be eliminated from the

practice of our party. And this active leadership has to be effected from the head: The Comintern leadership of the work of the Y.C.I. must not be an imposition of its will, but an active aid in its most difficult work. That leadership must cease to be a mere generality.

Some two years ago, when many of us raised the question of the weaknesses in the work of the Y.C.I., the comrades of the Y.C.I. reacted very painfully to this criticism. They saw in it a manifestation of elderly malevolence towards the Y.C.I., and in the worst case they thought of it as hidden opportunism. But many of us who had had some experience none the less saw that there was a weakness in your work in the Y.C.I. but it needed the facts of the last few months—the open decline in membership of the Y.C.L.s in Czecho-Slovakia, Britain, Norway—in order at last to bring the comrades of the Y.C.I. to listen to our criticism.

Comrades, I have no desire to reproach the present leadership of the Y.C.I. with these errors. I think that the present leadership has to a considerable extent to pay for the sins of a whole series of leaderships of the Y.C.I. Those methods of work which we shall criticise with you to-day, are not of yesterday and not of to-day. They have been developed over years: Comrades Khitarov, Furenberg, Nasanov and the rest now have to reckon the balance of these methods. Is it accidental for instance, that the former leaders of the Y.C.I. came out in the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* with articles of such a nature that afterwards they had to repudiate them? Is it by mere accident that Comrade Shatskin wrote an article in which he tried to oppose the collective will of the party with the will of a "critically thinking" personality? Is it a mere accident that Comrade Shatskin characterised the fidelity, the devotion of the members, who stand shoulder to shoulder in the struggle with opportunism, standing in unbroken rank both against Trotskyism and against the right-wing deviation, as party "citizenship"? Is it mere accident that on the other hand at the last conference a group of former leaders of the Y.C.I. put forward a proposal to extend the framework of the organisations of the poor, and in fact objectively urged the party towards the creation of a peasant union? Is it mere accident that elements of a grouping in opposition to the party have begun to form? No, all

this is not mere accident. We know that the Y.C.I. is acting against these deviations. But it began to act against these deviations after the party had already uttered its word on the subject. But why, comrades of the Y.C.I., did you not take the initiative into your own hands, when these articles appeared, and act against Comrade Shatskin's errors? Why didn't you? After all, in many questions you do take the initiative into your hands. Let us assume that any of us committed an error, and I am convinced that the comrades of the Y.C.I., who keenly watch to see that no errors shall be allowed, would take the initiative and would not even be afraid of accusing the C.C. of concealing these errors. But why then was there not the same determination in regard to the former leaders of the Y.C.L.?

What has stimulated us to raise the question of the Y.C.I. so severely? We have been impelled to this by the situation which has been created in the sections of the Y.C.I. Take the figures which Comrade Furenberg gave in his article, and which sketched the true picture of the condition of the Y.C.I. Here is the situation in the Y.C.I. sections, excluding that of the U.S.S.R. Legal Y.C.L.s, 72,225 in August, 1928; 61,308 in September, 1929; a decline of 16%. Illegal Y.C.L.s, 29,705 in August, 1928; 21,759 in September, 1929: a decline of 28%. A total decline by 18%. Comrade Furenberg says that the decline is no less than 20%, and that these figures are a little out of date. Note that this decline is occurring in a situation of a rise in the revolutionary wave. Not in circumstances of a reaction, but in circumstances of a radicalisation of the working youth. (Khitarov: The same applies in the Communist Parties.)

Their turn is coming. We shall deal with the Comintern also.

Take the figures for the Y.C.L. of France. Here we have a fall in membership from 7,000 to 6,000. In Czechoslovakia from 12,000 to 6,000—50%. In Britain from 900 to 600, and some will have it that the figure should be 300.

Now a further point: how is the growth of factory and works nuclei proceeding?

We wrote a resolution: the whole front to be at once turned towards the factories. But what has been done in this regard? Here, for instance, of the 22,000 in one of our best Y.C.L.'s, that of Germany, in January, 1928, 1,250 Young

Communists were in factory and works nuclei. But by March, 1929, only 900 were left. And now how many are there?

In France the position of factory and works nuclei is as follows: June, 1928, 80; March, 1929, 89; September, 1929, 39; In Czechoslovakia in 1926 there were 142; in 1927, 119; in 1928, 140; in March, 1929, 49 nuclei.

It is useless writing about the winning of a majority of the working-class and the consolidation of the party in the factories if we come to the present Plenum with this sort of figure.

There, comrades, is a picture which forces you to think. It is not with a light heart that we criticise the work of the Y.C.I.

Now let us see how things stand in the camp which is opposed to ours, in the camp of the bourgeoisie. I don't mean the organisations of the bourgeoisie and the fascist divisions. I am speaking of the organisation of our class, proletarian youth, who are entering the bourgeois organisations in large masses.

In the German Catholic Youth Union you have 1,500,000 youths; in nine reformist unions you have 850,000. In two social-democratic unions you have 57,000 members. The sport organisation in France has a membership of 4,000,000. The railway workers' clubs embrace 60,000; the youth clubs in the Vendel heavy industrial enterprises have 80,000.

During one year 72,000,000 persons passed through the sports arenas in the U.S.A.; 6,000,000 are in the German sports organisations.

These figures confront us not merely with the problem of the Y.C.I., to-day we must face up to the problem of the youth and the problem of the revolution in all its magnitude. Can there be serious talk of revolution, when we are ignoring the problem of the generation growing up, which has not lived through the horrors of the imperialist war? Do you think that in the Italian Fascist State at the present time—where hundreds of thousands of proletarian children are being educated in the spirit of fascism, where the worker youth is entering the fascist organisations—do you think that you will find it so easy to win these youths? Compare that system of education with that which obtains in the Soviet Union. In the U.S.S.R. we are now passing millions of proletarian and peasant children through the factory of our socialist construction; we are educating them in the ideas of Soviet

labour, and love of the socialist revolution. We are creating a new generation of man. No reaction whatever would ever have the power to deal with these young battalions, now rising from the soil. But in the fascist State do you think they are doing their work any worse than we? All the publicists of the bourgeoisie, all the generals and the "great butchers," now realise the importance of the youth, and are saying in one voice: for the coming war, for the consolidation of the capitalist system we need a young generation which is not only educated in our barracks, in our schools, but is receiving an intellectual, moral and political education in established political organisations. To this end the bourgeois State is setting up enormous organisations into which the worker youth are being drawn.

Thus on the one hand you have these millions, and on the other our little organisations standing confronting one another. Against us is mobilised an enormous machine, with the aid of which the bourgeoisie is intellectually mincing the working youth. The third period is characterised not only by the growth of cartels of trusts, but also by the increased role of the class State of the bourgeoisie. This State is now penetrating into all the pores of social, economic, political, and cultural relationships. The capitalist State is interlocked with the trusts and the cartels. It itself acts in the capacity of a great capitalist and banker. It has an enormous centralised administrative, military and police machinery at its disposition. It has subjected the "workers" reformist organisations to itself, it has made all the political parties, except the Communists, its instruments and agents. Whether it be the fascist State of Mussolini, or the social-fascist State of the German social-democracy, the so-called "social State," they are all in equal degree an instrument for the suppression of the working-class. "The social State," says the social-fascist president of the Reichstag, Loebe, "is a State which "cares for the pregnant mother and the new-born child. . . . it takes upon itself the task of the professional education not only of the future officials and scientists, but the craftsmen, the peasants and the workers. It regulates the insurance of the sick, the invalids, the victims of accidents, the aged; within certain limits it protects the unemployed. It intervenes in conflicts over

wages, it mediates between the parties, forces them back to work or to the opening of the factories. It reacts on import and export, it protects the cartels or keeps them under observation. It takes on itself the care of millions of war victims, it recompenses the losses of the refugees and the exiles. From the cradle to the grave the hand of the State intervenes in the private affairs of individuals and groups to an extent completely unprecedented."

And none the less, despite all its ramified machinery, despite all its might, the bourgeois State surrounds itself with "subsidiary organisations," with the aid of which it seeks to subjugate the growing worker generation to its influence. The schools, the churches, the police, the judiciary, the army are inadequate to hold the millions of toilers in subjugation to it. It creates further new forms of all possible kinds of "free," "non-party" organisations, which complement its own pressure on the consciousness of the working-class. If the trusts and cartels take the body of the worker, the present-day capitalist State is through its auxiliary organisations striving to capture his mind. They have carried off the proletarian spirit of those 80,000 worker youths who are members of the organisations of Vendel, the king of French heavy industry.

And what have we to oppose to this finely worked-out machine of perversion, of demoralisation of the oppressed classes?

Only our Young Communist organisations.

Don't you yourselves feel that this is insufficient, that we have to oppose the whole system of pressure brought to bear by the capitalist State on the worker youth with our own ramified network of "auxiliary organisations," paralysing the influence of the bourgeoisie? We must reply to the methods of the class antagonist with carefully planned methods of struggle for the worker youth carried out in practice.

But, comrades, if undoubtedly we are not afraid of our own demoralisation when we join the imperialist army in order to disintegrate it, if we enter such organisations of the fascist State as the fascist Trade Unions, in order to break them up from within and to win the workers in these unions to our side, why is it that so far we have not faced up to the fact that you ought to enter those bourgeois organisations of which the

worker youth are members, in order to break up these organisations, in order to bring the honest worker elements out from under their yoke, and to take them under your own leadership? Take an example from France. Eight months ago a Catholic organisation was set up there, and in these eight months they have a membership of 44,000 exclusively worker youth. The Catholic priests will not allow the sons of the bourgeoisie to be members; they are carrying out a cunning demagogic tactic, by drawing into their organisations only teachers of workers; they have put forward a sectional programme of demands, which in many regards approximates to the programme of sectional demands of our own Y.C.I. And how many Young Communists and Communists are there in this organisation to wrest this worker youth away from the influence of the spirituality? Where are they? In Italy fascism is striving to annihilate our Communist Party, our Y.C.L. There we have hundreds and thousands of arrested workers, trials leading to long years of penal servitude. In such conditions the capture by our Italian comrades of those organisations which are the only legally existing bodies under the fascist regime constitutes one of the basic tasks of the Young Communists. Comrade Zheldak will tell you how a few months ago "Dopo-Lavoro" was organised in Italy: a sports holiday into which several dozen thousand workers were drawn, and how these workers demonstrated their hostility to fascism. But I ask you, what influence was our party or the Y.C.L. in this demonstration? Answer, comrades of the Y.C.L., where are you? And after that you will say you are not afraid of the masses—and you don't join these organisations? Is this anything like the policy of the Russian Bolsheviks, who joined the societies for teaching literacy, the temperance societies, the evening universities, the musical and theatrical circles during the years of reaction, and went everywhere where the workers were gathered? But you? Until the Fifth Congress you had not settled the question of whether your youth sections should exist in the trade unions. Only at the Fifth Congress did you decide that. But tell me, how many new youth sections have you formed since the decision of the Fifth Congress? I say that your fundamental weakness is fear of the masses, and on this weakness your attention should be concentrated. Here is the source of

all your weakness. There is one example which you will not like at all. It is a little incident which occurred with comrades from the Y.C.I. on the matter of the pacifist congress of youth, which you refused to attend in order to unmask the pacifist nonsense. But isn't that example indicative? You shout that we want to make you unpolitical, because we turn you with your face to the masses, because we want to eradicate your fear of the masses. Comrades, we don't want to make you less political, but we want to politicalise the movement which is now developing apart from the Y.C.I., apart from the Communist Parties, and to politicalise them on the basis of the most elementary needs of the working-class, its demands, to capture them and to bring them into politics. We want to stimulate you into penetrating those masses. That is how the Bolsheviks worked and that is how our Communist Parties ought to work. We want not to render you unpolitical, but we want to unpoliticalise you from your bad group work and to politicalise you by forcing you to carry on a good mass policy. That is our task for this Plenum. Did we want to render you less political when we recommended you to take a most active part in the August 1st campaign? On the eve of August 1st, when the bourgeoisie was mobilising all its forces to suppress this demonstration against war, when it was spreading the rumour that the Comintern had appointed August 1st as the date for the world revolution, we said to you, comrades of the Y.C.L.s—organise a number of demonstrations in the streets before August 1st, dissipate the strength of the enemy, don't let him have a breathing-space. Did you pay heed to this call, did you respond to it? you who declaim about being rendered unpolitical? Did you, with the exception of timid efforts in Germany, organise many such demonstrations in other countries? On the eve of August 1st we said to you: comrades of the Y.C.L.s, draw your reserves into the struggle against the imperialist war, mobilise the sports organisations on August 1st for street demonstrations. And now say what rôle the Y.C.I. played in the task of drawing sports organisations into the August 1st demonstration. And we said to you further: now it is necessary to have intensified military work in the army in connection with August 1st. It is necessary to prepare and organise the

fraternisation of workers with soldiers, for it is absolutely clear that the condition of the military work in the parties is a pulse by means of which we can test the opportunism in our ranks ; the army is the holy of holies of the bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie is more afraid of the disintegration of the army than anything else, and its courts punish most heavily of all for work in the army, And it is here that our parties reveal the greatest passivity, reveal the greatest legalism. And what did you do in regard to military work ? Your military work was even worse than in normal times. You not only forgot our instructions on the eve of August 1st, you forgot the basic decisions of the Comintern congresses on this question. Amongst the twenty-one conditions of membership of the Communist International, there is that which says that :

"All parties belonging to the Communist International must carry on a systematic and persistent Communist work in the trade unions, co-operative societies, workers' and industrial councils, and other mass organisations."

What does the fulfilment of this condition demand of us ? does it signify your being rendered less political ? Yet when we raised the question of the necessity to exploit auxiliary organisations in order to capture the worker youth, you threw back that accusation. For instance, at a meeting of the Russian delegation to the Y.C.I., Comrade Khitarov expounded the views of Comrade Kuusinen and myself more or less in this fashion : (Khitarov : "Last year's views.") Very good : last year's. "We have had differences with older comrades. These differences amounted to Comrades Kuusinen and Manuilsky wanting to transform the Y.C.I. into mainly a cultural organisation." But, comrades, we may be not merely older, we may even be elderly comrades, but even so we're not yet suffering from senile decay. I don't think the Y.C.I. would invite any of us here if we put forward that kind of social-democratic proposal. If we had insisted on the view that the Y.C.I. should be transformed into a purely cultural organisation, you should at that meeting have thrown rotten apples and bad eggs at us.

Take your last resolution. This resolution is indicative of your fear of the masses. You make a sharp change, you speak of the necessity for a line for the masses. But immediately after you make a dozen reservations, guaranteeing you

from doing any political work whatever in subsidiary organisations. You decry that work in advance by every means possible. You have a conception that a turn towards the masses is opportunism and that it is bound up with becoming less political. But what is there in common between such a view and our Bolshevik insistence on the masses ? Such a view is the purest distillation of Kautskyism : the characteristic feature of Kautsky in his discussion with Rosa Luxemburg before the war was this very scorn of the "politically-immature" masses ; only Kautsky used it to hide his opportunism, and you to hide your sectarianism. Bolshevism always struggled against such a conception of the masses.

Your resolution is a deterioration of a very good resolution which you wrote for the Fifth Congress. If we are going to talk of a *volte-face* of an ideological nature, it was you who did that at the Fifth Congress, and now your present resolution repeats what you said in your Fifth Congress resolution. (Khitarov : In other words, there has been a change not merely as the result of the lessons of this year ? But you asserted the change had begun only this year.)

I assert that two years ago when we raised the question, you did not listen to our advice and so you had to return again to this question so belatedly.

Here comrades is what the resolution of your Fifth Congress says :

A. The frequent substitution of phrases about mass-activity for practical mass-activity itself ; insufficient political activity on the part of the leagues, especially as regards the all-round defence of the interests of young workers ("youth policy") insufficient activity and initiative on the part of the member masses, which are still to a great degree limited to their own organisations.

B. Insufficiently "youthful" working methods in the leagues, which merely ape the party ; superficiality, agitational phrases. . . .

C. The want of concentration in work in the industrial concerns and in the mass-organisations; particular shortcomings in this respect in the trade unions and sports organisations.

D. The non-employment of the system of auxiliary organisations.

Hence the resolution of the Fifth Congress drew the conclusion :

1. . . . The reanimation of the internal life of the leagues, making it more interesting and attractive for the young workers, and thus restricting the fluctuation in the ranks of the leagues . . . ”

2. The improvement of our agitation and propaganda among the masses, rendering these more comprehensible, more attractive, and more suitable to the juvenile psychology.

3. . . . the establishment of youth sections and youth commissions in the trade unions, the military (soldiers and recruits) and semi-military organisations (“youth front”) the cultural organisations of various kinds (sporting, free-thinker, and tourist organisations) youth sections in the peasant associations . . . legal organisations in the “illegal” countries.

In a word, you will never write a better resolution. A notable resolution, and now will you who have assembled here from all countries be so kind as to say what you have done to realise this resolution? Tell us what you have done so far to win the worker youth, which are members of the sports and other organisations of the bourgeoisie? Speak up, comrades. Possibly one of you can tell us a little, I’m quite prepared to let him have the time allotted to me. Tell us how many nuclei you have established in these organisations. Well, comrades? (A silence). How many new youth sections have you established in the trade unions? (Silence.) Don’t be modest, comrades—how many new nuclei have you established in the large enterprises in fulfilment of the decision of the E.C.C.I., Tenth Plenum? Tell us, if you will, where any members of your organisations are working actively in sports organisations. Possibly the American comrades will tell us how a sports union of 8,000 strong was organised without their participation. What new auxiliary organisations have you established since the Fifth Congress? (One delegate makes a reply in German.)

Well, comrades, tell me how many nuclei you have in industry.

What is there new in your resolution, after the old words concerning a change? But wouldn’t it be better if you didn’t repeat that, which you have already said in your Fifth Congress resolution, but by vital definite examples were to show how the work ought to be done, were to popularise the good examples and to stigmatise the

stupid, thus politically educating your ranks? But how have you worked in reality? Here is one example for you. On the eve of September 1st in Carlsbad, Czechoslovakia, the local president of police called our Young Communists to him and asked them: “According to rumours which have reached us you are planning to organise something on September 1st on the lines of August 1st. . . . Look here, young men, we’re occupied with other matters on September 1st, and we cannot give adequate attention to your procession. Can’t you arrange it so that your demonstration is put off to some other day?” The Young Communists proudly turned down the proposition and decided not to adopt the suggestion made by the Karlsbad chief of police. A fine example of revolutionary consciousness, isn’t it? But what really happened? On September 1st everything went as the chief of police had asked. (An uproar, laughter, and a voice: “That was the decision of the party.”) So much the worse, comrades. (Uproar.)

Really, if you are going to talk about opportunism in practice, that is the clearest illustration one could have to it. What else but opportunism in practice is the fact that all you who have assembled here have carried out neither the decision of the Fifth Congress nor the decision of the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. That is why you are opportunists in practice. You declaim a lot about winning the majority of the working-class, about the proximity of decisive struggles, you pay a great deal of lip service to the decisions of the E.C.C.I. Tenth Plenum, but you have done altogether too little so far in order to give life to those decisions in practice. In words you stand for the third period, but in deed you are still in the second period. Is it third period tactics for instance to exclude the application of the united front tactic in its new forms? You talk of the necessity for mass work—give an example of how you have successfully applied the tactic of the united youth front since the Fifth Congress and the E.C.C.I. Tenth Plenum. Can there be serious talk of the winning the masses, of great class battles, without applying this method of mobilising the worker youth? But I will leave it to one of your Y.C.I. instructors who visited the British Y.C.L. organisation to tell how you have applied the tactic of the united front. This

instructor read in the Y.C.L. newspaper that one of the Y.C.L. organisations was developing great activity in its district in applying the united front tactic, by organising unity committees, anti-fascist organisations, the minority movement. In a word, every day there was a committee. But in reality, when the instructor visited this organisation he found there six or seven Young Communists, who acted under various names, merely changing their chairs. To-day they were an anti-fascist league, to-morrow a committee of unity and so forth. That is what they call the united front tactic. If we carry out the united front tactic like that we shall shatter and destroy the Y.C.I., we shall never transform the Y.C.I. into a mass organisation.

Have you ruthlessly revealed these errors to all the members of the Y.C.L. organisations? Have you carried on any discussion as to the change on the basis of that kind of practical example? Have you said clearly and definitely what has to be done in every one of your nuclei in order to achieve this change? Again it is preferable to answer with a summary example from your practice on this issue.

Here, for instance, is the largest enterprise in Berlin—the Siemens works. In this enterprise the Y.C.L. nucleus raised the question of the tasks of the nucleus and as a second item the election of representatives to the delegate conference. The instructor arrives—a student himself, having no knowledge of the enterprise, never having had any real idea of the tasks of this nucleus. He utters general phrases about social-democracy, about fascism. And afterwards there is not a word of objection, not a moment's discussion. They pass directly to the election of delegates. The instructor declares that one must be appointed by the nucleus, and the other will be himself. This noteworthy system is in the period of independent activity! Well, very good, this instructor may have possessed certain Buonapartist traits, but afterwards, when the secretary of the Berlin Y.C.L. committee was informed of this, he didn't see anything abnormal in this conduct whatever. That is the very "abnormality" of the situation! What is there to be surprised at if after that you have fluctuations and losses in membership?

Your fear of the masses has its counterpart in the internal structure of your organisation, your

habits of keeping yourselves to yourselves. The Y.C. Leaguers at the enterprises keep themselves in a special group, develop a special kind of caste spirit. They are dominated by a contempt for the rest of the masses of worker youth. What have they to do with us, "chosen ones," conscious "children of the sun"? Instead of mass work, "we" and "they." A clique psychology instead of a Bolshevik approach to the unorganised youth. And so the movements of that youth are carried on without any appearance of the Y.C.L.s whatever.

The Y.C.L. must be a wider organisation than the Communist Party. At one of the congresses, the E.C.C.I. reporter outlined the following pyramid: the party at the top, then a wider organisation—the Y.C.L.—then the trade unions. But in practice this pyramid is inverted: the Y.C.L. with its narrower organisational basis is at the top, the party below, and then the T.U.s.

In order to illustrate the narrowness of the Y.C.I. basis, one has merely to compare a few figures for the membership of the C.P.s and the Y.C.L. in each country. The membership of the German C.P. is 130,000, that of the Y.C.L. is 22,000; the French C.P. is 50,000, the Y.C.L. 6,000; the Czechoslovakian C.P. is 60,000, the Y.C.L. is 6,000; and so on. Can such a situation be regarded as normal?

The Y.C.I. has never independently raised its own questions of mass work, it is very good that in all political problems the Y.C.I. has always gone hand in hand with the Comintern, but it is bad that in the matter of mass work they have not once displayed any personal initiative. With the Comintern you have been a second young party, but with a narrower basis. The Y.C.I. has copied the parties in everything. To-day the Comintern decides to set up anti-fascist committees, to-morrow you take the same decision; to-day we raise the slogan of an institute of plenipotentiaries, you immediately take up the same slogan. We began to talk of setting up a league against imperialism. Immediately comrades from the Y.C.I. came to us and said: Give us a young league against imperialism, we cannot live without it. (Laughter.) Well, very good, you established a young colonial league. Well, but what were its practical results? Did you read and did you discuss even the resolution of the congress of colonial youth?

I am not sinning against the truth when I say that so far you haven't found time to read through these documents.

The Y.C.I. methods of work are for the youth: your resolutions are restrained in principle, they are not badly written, but they are written in a style which politically mature people are able to digest, but for the youth they are too heavy.

That is why there is such a disproportion between the "uppers" and the "lowers" in your ranks. At your head you have splendid politicians, but your mass membership is essentially unpolitical; they do not read your resolutions and they run away from the Y.C.L. organisations, because their life does not satisfy the worker youth.

Here, for instance, you have issued a book on the change, but it is hardly likely to reach the lower ranks of your organisations. But if it does reach them, after the Young Communists have turned its pages over and read extracts from the speeches and resolutions, they will quietly push the book under a pile of others, so as to forget it. Or take your meetings, where in accordance with a long-established ritual—first the minutes are read, then several other formalities are observed, there are brief exchanges of views on a number of petty details, and there is a hurry to close such a meeting, which is sufficient to leave a feeling of deep annoyance and dissatisfaction not only among youngsters but even among grown-ups. Can you raise the enthusiasm of the masses in that way? Look at your newspapers: there are dry articles in them, which it is true are always in an irreproachable political language, but is that what is necessary? Give us a vital eloquent story, which the youth will read with avidity, and give us the same politics, only in a more vital and picturesque form, and you will be influencing the youth by means more accessible to them. But your newspapers are copied from our newspapers, and frequently the copy is of a poorer quality than our own press organs.

Then take the question of the struggle with deviations in our organisations. The Y.C.I. always struggled splendidly against the right-wing deviations, no one has any right to utter a word of reproach against you in that regard. But the struggle against the "left-wing" zig-zags was not so well carried out by you. In this

regard both in the past and now there are defects in your work which have to be eliminated at this Plenum. But deviations are one thing, and isolated errors are another. Can you at all struggle against errors as you would against deviations, especially in the Y.C.L. organisations? A deviation appears when people stand by their errors, but a simple error is not in itself a reason for applying remedies of an organisational nature to him who has committed it in Y.C.L. organisations. But you very frequently far too hastily apply organisational remedies, without even explaining what the errors are; but meantime your tasks consist in educating the youth, and not merely drawing the organisational conclusions. You treat a simple mistake more harshly than does the party. Take, for instance, the last Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.—a party which has never been particularly distinguished for its forbearance to deviations. Did we throw comrades Rykov and Tomsky out of the Political Bureau at the last session of the Plenum? And yet it would appear to be very plain that these men had not only committed a number of serious political errors but had also been expressing the rightward deviation in the C.P.S.U. And if none the less our party allowed itself the luxury of leaving Comrades Rykov and Tomsky as members of the directing bodies of the party, it wasn't at all through forbearance to the rightward deviation, but because the complete bankruptcy of the whole system of views held by the rightward deviators had been laid bare to the eyes of the wide party masses, because through this step the party, strong in its victory, afforded the opportunity to those who were on the way to recognising their errors, to correct them. But if the party standing at the head of the proletarian dictatorship of one of the greatest States in the world takes up such an attitude to its members on the question of correcting their line, then the Y.C.I. should work far more on such lines, since it has to do with youthful, politically untried material. If a Y.C. Leaguer utters some political absurdity put him right in such a fashion that others will hear, so that through this error they themselves shall learn to bring to light the errors of others; but correct without giving offence, without causing irritation, without affronting youthful self-esteem; try by all means to explain rather than to make organisational deductions.

Finally, a word on yet one other defect in your work—in its shop-window aspect. On paper everything is O.K., everywhere there is nothing but success, but in reality the situation is otherwise. Here for instance, is a report from one of the German Y.C.L. organisations. The report says that twenty new nuclei have been formed. It would seem there was nothing to pick holes in here, only matter for praise; but during this same period they lost eighteen old nuclei, only you will not find a word about that in the report. This system of throwing dust in the eyes, this system of self-deception has to be fought quite determinedly. We need the truth, the harsh Bolshevik truth, and we have to look that truth in the eyes.

My deductions, comrades? It's time to cease "philosophising" concerning a change, and to show in action how you understand this change and how you are realising it in practice. You must take hold of all the forms of the proletariat's class struggle: strikes, demonstrations, and so on. You must work out organisational instructions, explaining to the youth how it is necessary to work, so that not one movement of the workers, of the youth should take place without the Y.C.L. organisation. And in the very centre you must place the abandoned work in the enterprises, you must turn up your sleeves and join the sports organisations, you must join the opponents' organisations, where you will find the youth, in order to win them to the side of Communism. It is indispensable to work out a system whereby the Y.C.L. organisation is hedged around with auxiliary organisations, and to develop the very greatest initiative in this direction.

You must modify your methods of working, you must revive the methods of agitation and propaganda among the youth, you must reorganise the organisation, making it wider, transferring the Y.C.L. organisations into mass organs. That is the chief task of the present Plenum of the Y.C.I.

You mustn't think that the defects and weaknesses of the Y.C.I. are quite separate from the general state of the Comintern sections. The morbid phenomena of various sections of the Y.C.L. are bound up with the abnormal state of the corresponding C.P.s. These morbid phenomena merely find even

clearer expression in the Y.C.L. And so in the Y.C.I. we are now feeling the defects and weaknesses of the Comintern. In criticising the Y.C.I., in correcting your line, we are also striking at those sections of the Comintern which are at present suffering the same travails, and which do not know how to carry on mass work in Bolshevik fashion.

We write resolutions about the third period, the growth of a new revolutionary wave, the mass uprise, the radicalisation of the working class, but meantime in Britain our C.P. is losing members in spite of the fact that the MacDonald Government is revealing its true colours with every day. How is this phenomenon to be explained? It falls among the crisis travails which we call crisis of growth. The history of the C.P.S.U. even during the period of proletarian dictatorship has known no few such "crises," after which our party's influence with the great masses of toilers grew still more, and the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. was established still more firmly. One has but to recall our recent difficulties which put the right-wing deviators into a panic. Such "crises" usually signalise to the party that it is necessary to get a reorientation and necessary to modify the methods of work. They tell the party that the operation of the chief tasks in the new stage by means of the old methods is outworn, and that the party must reorganise in accordance with the needs of the workers' movement. But while this reorientation is taking place there occurs a suspense in the relationships between the party and the masses, and that suspense is got through all the quicker if the change to the new direction is carried out the more energetically. And this applies to all the parties of the Comintern which are suffering a contraction of their organisational basis, but it applies first and foremost to Britain. The accuracy of this diagnosis can be seen by the example of the British Minority Movement.

The last Minority Movement Congress in Britain—a movement which a year or two ago numbered a million adherents—merely marked time, revealed a certain amount of confusion in the search for new organisational forms. It was felt that the party was only groping towards the new roads of approach to the masses. It recognises that the old organisa-

tional amorphousness of the Minority Movement must be got rid of, but there is still lack of clarity as to the new forms, as to what the Minority Movement ought to be.

The old forms of the united front tactic, formerly effected through the Anglo-Russian Committee, through the "left" wing of the Labour Party, are outworn. The old points of connection with the left-wing elements of the workers' movement through Maxton and Cook have been destroyed irrevocably. The new forms of united front tactic are in course of crystallisation. The party is still without experience of the new roads, it has not learnt to exploit the new methods of united front tactic. Voices are heard declaring that the Minority Movement ought to be transformed into a second edition of the party. The authors of these proposals do not realise that the Minority Movement must be built up on a broader basis than is the party. They constrict the united front tactic, which ought to be at the very basis of the Minority Movement, into the framework of the party, repeating the errors of the French comrades, who during the Moroccan War drew into a united workers' front only those who entirely adopted the party programme. Thus a very narrow basis was provided for the worker-peasant committees for struggle against French imperialism. We all feel now that in the work of winning the masses we need wider organisations than the Communist Parties. Unless we develop this type of organisation around ourselves we shall never break through to the masses, we shall never smash the wall standing between them and us in the form of the still strong reformist organisations.

This was the sense of the proposal put forward by one of our best sections in the Comintern, the German C.P., which, of course, holds the palm in the work of effecting a united front tactic. This largest mass party realised that it will not now take a single step forward along the road of consolidating its influence among the masses, unless it throws up and gives life to such organisational forms of capturing the masses as will allow it to embrace all the strata of the working class sympathetic to it. The Minority Movement in Britain also should be such an organisational form of capturing the working masses for the

British C.P. We are now only groping for the new forms of united front tactic. For instance, revolutionary rivalry has to be accounted one of those forms. We have not yet thoroughly mastered it, we haven't thought about it sufficiently, we have no experience of its application in action as yet. But given a sound approach to this new form of united front tactic we may achieve enormous results. So far this revolutionary rivalry is developing along party, T.U., Y.C.L. lines. That is not bad, but it is insufficient. We must bring larger sections of the working class into revolutionary rivalry. We must bring up the proletarian reserves which have hitherto remained outside our influence. Through revolutionary rivalry we may come to the creation of Communist factory or works nuclei where they do not at present exist. But in order to achieve this it is necessary to develop revolutionary rivalry among the worker masses of the factories themselves. Factory rivalling factory—that may be brought into the basis of the new forms of united front tactic. Thus we may be able to forge the idea of class proletarian solidarity, which has been shattered by the reformists and social-democrats.

If we widely develop the experience of revolutionary rivalry among factories, with persistence and firmness on our part, we may create such a rank-and-file fundamental connection between the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. and workers abroad as no Anglo-Russian committees could ever give us. Suppose that the workers of one of our works challenges the workers of a British works, one where there isn't the least suspicion of Communism, where there isn't any Communist nucleus. Our workers write an open letter, this letter is published in the British Communist newspaper. Suppose that none of the British workers reacts to this challenge. The matter mustn't be left to rest there. This letter must be reprinted in thousands of copies, must be distributed at the gates of the works, ten-minute meetings must be organised, one or two men must be won over individually, their declarations affirming their readiness to accept the challenge of the Soviet workers must be printed in our papers, we must insist on delegates being sent from this works to

the U.S.S.R., we must remind them with fresh letters, we must either send our own delegation from the U.S.S.R. or a delegation of German workers, for instance, in order to break up the ice of indifference and passivity, and so on. In a word, the British Communists must struggle for the achievement of revolutionary rivalry, and not wait for it to develop without them. There must be no throwing up of slogans incomprehensible to the broad masses of British workers during the course of such mass revolutionary rivalry. That rivalry must be organised around slogans directly affecting that mass: war, capitalistic rationalisation, the eight-hour day, and so on.

Our crisis of growth is bound up not only with a crisis in the united front tactic, but with a crisis of organisational forms. It is indisputable that the chief form of capturing the masses has always been and still remains the trade unions. One of our most important tasks is the winning of the trade unions.

But it would be shortsighted not to see the modifications which are occurring with extreme rapidity of recent days. The reformist bureaucracy organises splits wherever we are near to winning a majority, they expel handfuls wherever we are a minority. The reformists have learnt a little from the lesson of the defeat of the Russian Mensheviks. If we do not take measures to defend ourselves this reformist policy threatens to cut us off from the trade unions. We must see the tendency, we must see where we are going, and equip ourselves against every contingency. We cannot further suffer the disintegrated state of our revolutionary opposition in the reformist unions, which only makes it easier for the reformists in the struggle with us. Is it accidental that the German comrades have just raised the question of the necessity of organisationally capturing the revolutionary opposition? This disintegration is extremely dangerous, for by the example of the organisationally disintegrated nature of the British Minority Movement in the past we have seen how expensive it can be to us afterwards. When we carry out an organisational review of our forces we are forced to realise that there is a tremendous disproportion as against our political influence. We cannot slip out of this

task by arguing that we must not allow ourselves to provoke the reformists into expelling us from the unions.

It is insufficient merely to repeat: Conquer the trade unions! At the same time there must be a definite analysis of the circumstances in which the Communist work in the trade unions is being carried on. But those circumstances are in capitalist countries not altogether similar to those which the Russian Communists had in 1917. Had the Menshevik trade unions so completely fused with the machinery of the bourgeois State as the present-day reformist unions have? It was a dozen times easier for us to fight the Mensheviks in the Russian trade unions than it is for our comrades in capitalist countries to fight the reformist bureaucracy. The whole machinery of the capitalist State exploits this bureaucracy in order to shatter the Communists in the trade unions, and to cut them off from the masses.

To compare this situation mechanically with the Russian experience is like recommending the old-fashioned Russian battle-axe for fighting a tank.

The problem of the organisational forms of our capture of the masses is complicated also by the circumstance that unorganised masses are drawn into the movement, there is an unemployed movement developing outside the trade unions. Of course it is hard for a revolutionary and a Communist to call on the unorganised workers to join the reformist unions. Who needs to mention the fact? Of course we should like to capture these strata of workers who are becoming politically active, as well as the unemployed, for our own organisations. There are many temptations along this road, but for that very reason the policy of "experiments," the policy of deciding this question without accumulating corresponding experience, without a sober estimate of our own forces and those of the opponent, is the most dangerous of all. We are incessantly groping for new forms for the organisational capture of the masses. But so long as we feel firm ground beneath our feet we ought not to allow ourselves to be diverted from the line we have taken up. Here there must be no leaping ahead, as Lewis Jones, of South Wales, did, when he declared that if

we create strike committees, committees of action, then down with the trade unions! This is a simplified setting of the problem which is unserviceable for the transitional period. We must fight tooth and nail for every position in the reformist unions, and must not surrender any of them without a struggle. And it is to that surrender that this simplified tactic of those who say "either-or" leads. The conditions of the transitional period compel us to combine various forms of our own organisations of the masses with a stubborn work in the reformist unions. This dualism is not of our invention, but arises from the definite circumstances of the present day. But comrades, if we must not at the moment hasten with the formation of new trade unions, yet wherever we are placed in a position in which we have our own unions, we must hang on to our new unions tooth and nail. There we must concentrate all the forces of the working class in order to support the movement organised by these unions. These new unions are a matter of honour for the advance guard of the working class. The working class learns not from books, but from the experience of the revolutionary struggle. And they will test our new unions in the fire of struggle. In developing our strike struggle we must show in practice that our militant revolutionary tactic guarantees greater success to the workers entering the struggle than does the reformists' tactic. We must not surrender to the provocation of the employers, we must previously estimate all the chances for and against the strike at the given moment, but once we have gone into the struggle we must exert all our strength in order to see that that battle ends in victory.

Of course in no strike can we say in advance that undoubtedly we shall win. But it is the duty of the Communists organising the new unions to do everything possible in order to have the victory. That is the real importance of the strike of the pipelayers in Berlin.

For this was our own union, expelled from the reformist union! It began the struggle under most difficult conditions, having been previously betrayed by the reformists. That strike was an examination for our union. The reformists knew that perfectly, and they did everything possible to shatter the pipelayers'

movement. And we in our turn should have mobilised the working masses into the support of this strike. "Yes, the Communists are to be reckoned with, they know how to fight, you can trust them to defend our interests better than the social-democrats." In reality this strike was carried on in conditions of isolation. We do not demand of the German comrades that this strike should have ended in victory at all costs. No, only right-wing fools can think that a strike may be begun only when you have victory in your grasp. We know that in present-day conditions of the fusion of the employers' and reformist organisations with the machinery of the capitalist State the difficulties of the working class struggle are very great. We shall more than once carry out a strike which will end in nothing or defeat. But under no circumstances may we draw from this the conclusion that every strike has only a revolutionary educational importance, that its practical success is a side-issue.

Try going to a worker and saying: In present conditions no strike whatever can end in victory, because we are suppressed by the machinery of the capitalist State, the employers' organisations, etc., but none the less we call on you to enter the struggle. And what will be his answer? The worker will say: These Communists are remarkable for the way in which they foresee everything. But why should I get mixed up in an obviously unsuccessful strike? I'll wait till better times, or till the last decisive struggle. We have had such attitudes in our day from the French railway workers. They are not to be ignored.

And now, in considering the results of the pipelayers' strike, we must openly and frankly say that the German party, despite all the efforts of its leadership, did not realise the importance of this strike, did not do everything possible to support it. And that is the chief defect in the work of waging the pipelayers' strike.

I now turn to the question of how the Tenth Plenum decisions are being put into force, and first and foremost how the task of winning the majority of the working class is being carried on since the Tenth Plenum. Just a few figures and facts.

Here you have the Czech party—one of our mass parties, which is moving on to the win-

ning of the majority of the working class. The latest figures have shown a loss of Communist votes in the most important industrial areas : Prague, 27 per cent. decline; Brno, 21 per cent.; Budweis, 28 per cent.; Kladno, 35 per cent.; Pilsen, 16 per cent. There has been a loss of votes in the areas of the national minorities also : Carpathian Ukraine, 64.5 per cent.; in the agrarian district of Slovakia, 33 per cent.

To be smitten with panic over this is of course stupid; we are losing travelling-companions, who are frightened by the intensification of the class struggle; we are losing those who are sympathetic to the course of the party, but we are winning in those areas where we carry on strikes in Bolshevik fashion, as in Northern Bohemia, for instance. We are losing at the cost of the old opportunist course of the party and winning at the cost of the new Bolshevik course. That is the main fact. And the bad feature is that our party has not adequately inculcated this Bolshevik course into the mass as yet. The results would be quite different from those which we have obtained at the elections. But what is bad, and extremely bad, is that our party is losing in the factories to the benefit of the fascists. You will not find any explanation for this phenomenon except the passivity of the party. Thus in Witkovitz in the elections to the factory committees the Red Trade Unions received 3,159 votes in 1928, 1,638 votes in 1929—a loss of 50 per cent. In the elections to the miners' sickness departments in Moravia Ostrova the party lost 1,800 votes out of the 13,000 votes of the previous election, whilst the fascists more than doubled their votes. And yet at the Tenth Plenum we were talking of the Czech party as having come right up against the winning of a majority of the working class. If the Czech comrades proceed along the road of winning the factories at that rate they will not only not win a majority, but will lose those they have won.

And how is the decision of the Tenth Plenum concerning the mass political strike being carried out? On August 1st all our parties had big possibilities of showing their readiness to put this decision into force. In reality, with the exception of Greece and France, where was there any attempt to call a

mass political strike on August 1st? In not one country did we see any serious attempts to carry out even a one-hour general strike. Or take the question of self-defence organisations. Many resolutions have been written, many speeches made, but very little has been done. In a number of parties, even in France, divisions of well-armed social-fascists come out at Lille against the Communist workers. The social-fascists are now playing the rôle of sharpshooters (and snipers) in the bourgeoisie's struggle against the proletariat. In Jugo-Slavia those who are suspected of Communism are wiped out in dozens. In the U.S.A. special bands are organised to wipe out the leaders of the workers' movement. In Mexico and Cuba every political demonstration made by the Communists is bound up with the risk of being killed. And what have we done in order to protect the party and its leaders from this bestial execution by fascist hunters after Communist scalps?

We have talked a great deal of the necessity for the international education of the proletariat. Throughout Europe there is a wave of hunger strikes in prison—in Budapest, in Roumania, in Latvia, Finland and a number of other countries where the leading fighters of the working class are incarcerated.

Our comrades, essentially left by us to the arbitrariness of fate, writhe in loneliness in the fight. Have we done all we could in order to mobilise the masses for support to this kind of hunger strike? Or take the question of the terror in Jugo-Slavia. Have our parties manifested a sufficient feeling of internationalism? The history of the revolutionary movement has rarely known such a tempest of reactionary bacchanalia as is now occurring in Jugo-Slavia. Have our Communist parties responded to the call of the Communist International? Where are the demonstrations which we demanded? Why is there such a deathlike silence around the Jugo-Slavian terror? Hundreds of Communists are in prison, they are subjected to the most ruthless and mediaeval of tortures, their nails are torn out, their bones broken, their eyes gouged out, their teeth broken. Where is the working class? Does it hear? Why do not the larger sections of the Comintern respond? Let it be but a small demonstration, but this movement

must be called into being, the Communist parties are bound to react to that kind of happening. Have we really got to inscribe a twenty-second condition of acceptance into the Communist International in order to get the Communist parties out of their state of lethargy? The C.P.s must revolutionarily educate their cadres and the working class so that the suffering of leading fighters of our army, perishing behind the walls in Roumania, in the desert islands of Italy, in the Citadel of Warsaw, should find an echo through thousands of electrical threads in the working class.

You see that these few examples are sufficient to show clearly that we are still very far from carrying out the decisions of the Tenth Plenum. To throw the searchlight of self-criticism on our defects and weaknesses is to take a firm step forward towards their elimination. The triumphantly progressive five-year plan of Socialist construction, the approaching world economic crisis, are already shaking the edifice of capitalism; to-morrow they will inflict still greater blows upon that edifice. We are moving towards enormous historical revolutionary battles in a number of countries—battles of possibly a decisive nature.

But that does not absolve us of our respon-

sibility to-day of carrying out our week-day detail work for assembling the forces of the proletariat and of the proletarian youth first and foremost. We are not syndicalists, setting our hopes solely in the elemental side of the movement, we do not wait for the revolution with folded hands, we must incessantly work for its organisation and preparation. Your generation is the happy generation which will not only do the detail work and struggle at the barricades, but will build Socialism in all the world. We shall correct our general defects and childish ailments in common effort with you. We shall make the Y.C.I. a broad mass organisation of youth, for we are fighters and revolutionaries, soldiers of the revolution, and not its poets and romantics; we are people of the masses, and not the heroes of the individual. And the Executive Committee calls upon your Plenum of the Y.C.I. to carry out this preparatory detail work for the winning of the masses of proletarian youth on the basis of the rich experience accumulated by the Communist International, and by its most important section, the C.P.S.U. Your Plenum must begin not in word but in deed to effect that practical change in the task of transforming the Y.C.I. into a mass organisation of the proletarian youth.

## A Liberal-Bourgeois Interpretation of Indian History

**A. Mukherji, *Britain and India***

**A Review by B. Freier**

TWELVE months ago the Brussels Congress of the Second International “decided” that India can only be granted autonomy, since, said they, it falls into a transitional class of colony, where the blessed results of the civilising policy of imperialism have not yet been completely consolidated, and so the complete emancipation of such a country may yet fling it back into barbaric primitiveness, and exclude it “from the orbit of international commodity exchange.” Such a prospect greatly frightened the reverend fathers of social-imperialism, so

conscious of their responsibility to international capitalism. It did not frighten Chaman-Lal, the Indian reformist, who fawns simultaneously on British imperialism and the national bourgeoisie, but with considerable bias towards the latter. Chaman-Lal appeared to be highly indignant at the idea that the bourgeoisie regarded “him” as insufficiently civilised to be allowed independent exploitation of the Indian workers and peasants. So he organised an “uproarious” scene and together with a few other colonial reformists, demonstratively withdrew from the Congress.

This political clash reflected as clearly as in a mirror the different approach to British imperialism's colonial policy made by the British social-reformists and imperialists on the one hand and the national-reformist Indian bourgeoisie and its lackeys on the other, each with a view to justifying their claims to the domination of a country of three hundred millions.

But there is yet another force in modern India, one which is ever more actively emerging as an independent factor in the struggle for political power, and which is vigorously putting itself in opposition to both imperialism and the national-reformist bourgeoisie and its tools. The Indian proletariat has firmly entered the arena of political struggle. It needs now the historical confirmation of its leadership through revolution and the struggle for independence.

No matter how academic a history of India may appear to be, the proletariat will be right in judging it according to its bias: whether it defends the robber methods of the British bourgeoisie, the pretensions to exploitation of the national ruling classes, or develops the basic line of analysis and estimates of the historical "mission" of capitalism in the colonies which were enunciated in the theses of the Comintern Sixth Congress, and which reflect the viewpoint of the international proletariat and the interests of the toiling masses of the colonial world. The swifter rises the wave of revolutionary ferment in India, the more severe the crisis of the imperialist colonial régime, so the more severely and harshly is it necessary to judge every theoretical work on India—especially if written by Indian Communists—and the more ruthless must be the sentence.

It is from this aspect that one must approach the recently-published work by Comrade Mukherji: *Britain and India*. In this book Comrade Mukherji sets himself the task of revealing that under the influence of modifications in the nature of British economy and in the inter-relationship of class forces in Britain, there was a modification in the policy of British imperialism and so in that of imperialism in India, and how that policy reacted on the economic development of an enormous

country rich both in natural resources and in human labour.

Even in the introduction the reader is struck by the strange enunciation of the problem of Indian independence. Comrade Mukherji explains to the British proletariat that it has no reason to be afraid of an independent India as a competitor to British industry. "Undoubtedly," he writes, "Indian industry will develop as the result of the liberation of India. But inevitably India will for a long time remain predominantly an agricultural country, exchanging its agricultural products for other products, and, moreover, in an emancipated India, freely developing its productive forces, there will be an increase in the purchasing power of 325,000,000 of population. The growth of the latter even by 20 per cent. will enable India to purchase one-and-a-half times more goods in Britain than at present, without mentioning the necessity for India to double her present industrial equipment. The British workers have no reason to be afraid of an Indian revolution."

About a century ago the "falsifier of British history," as Marx called the well-known Liberal historian Macaulay, wrote much more eloquently on this same subject. "From the actual economic aspect," he wrote, "it would be much better for us if the Indian nation were governed well and independent of us, than if they were badly governed and subject to us. . . . It is infinitely more profitable to trade with civilised people than to govern savages. In reality it would be idiotic wisdom to prevent the transformation of hundreds of millions of people into our customers merely in order to keep them as our slaves." Nineteen years ago a less well-known writer, but a more practical British trader called on his fellow-countrymen to help the Chinese revolution against the Manchurians. "A revolution," this John Bull considered, "will Europeanise the habits of the Chinese. They develop a taste for European hats, and exploiting this fact, within a couple of months Japan has 'rehatted' China." (Dingle: *Chinese Revolution*, introduction.) The advantages of supporting a revolution are obvious. But what is there in common between this Liberal view of a British capitalist and the view of the proletariat? "The British working class

. . . will never be in a state to take a decisive step forward in Britain itself so long as it does not completely break with the policy of the ruling class on the Irish question." That is the sole sound enunciation for the problem of Indian independence, and that has to be drummed into the consciousness of the British proletariat. And that enunciation was provided by Marx long ago.

In his introduction Comrade Mukherji briefly formulates the results of British rule in India. "The stagnation was broken, the productive forces were afforded the possibility of a free development, laying down the road to fresh development. This was Britain's contribution to the cause of progress and the revolution in India." (p. 12.) What is this? A failure in formulation? A bad translation? We open the book at p. 107, where the author summarises the results of the hundred and fifty years of British rule and reviews the situation of the Indian peasantry at the beginning of the twentieth century. We must apologise in advance for a long quotation, but this one could not be bettered as revealing the author's viewpoint. "In former times the peasantry, as was frequently said, 'knew best of all how to work his land,' but that knowledge was restricted to the demand on production. Very frequently an exceptionally good harvest was regarded by the peasant as a failure, because with the low demand of the local market such a harvest was accompanied by an inevitable fall in prices.\* In its turn the restricted demand caused the peasant to be uninterested in increasing the fertility of his plot. When an unrestricted market opened before him, he was without sufficient knowledge, for he could draw it only from Western science. The peasant realised that he could sell all he was able to harvest, and even more, for the first time he learnt the previously unknown practical information which agricultural crops were most adapted and advantageous to his locality and even his plot. In exactly the

same way the new information on live-stock rearing improved the condition of his domestic cattle. The technical conditions also changed for the better, although the shortage of financial resources proved a serious obstacle to the distribution of new agricultural machinery among the peasantry. In a word, the harvest yield rose considerably by comparison with its previous level."† What is this but a perfect apology for imperialism? The picture is blatantly inaccurate in its essence, it obviously distorts the facts and the historical prospect. Wouldn't it be wiser for Comrade Mukherji to glance into the *Imperial Gazetteer*, the official publication of the Anglo-Indian Government? There he would find the following passages:—"It is frequently declared that the culture of cotton in India is declining in quality of recent years." "Recently there have been complaints as to the decline in quality of jute." Does Comrade Mukherji know that it has been established by all the authorities that the Indian cattle are degenerating, and that they are degenerating owing to the expensiveness and absence of cattle food, which in turn is explained by the governmental policy which encloses the forests and deprives the peasantry of pasture lands? How can a Communist, and an Indian Communist to boot, a Marxist, and so far as we know, even a Red Professor, seriously write that "the shortage of financial resources proved a serious obstacle to the distribution of new agricultural machinery among the peasantry"? And this among the Indian peasantry, three-fourths of whom see food only once a day! And what of the feudal survivals, the land-shortage, the spoliatory taxation policy of the Government? Not a word of it, not a syllable!

And one gets the impression that Comrade Mukherji is entirely enslaved to the bourgeois and liberal professors. "The present work," he announces in the preface, "is a polemic on the decolonisation theory of Roy." (p. 14.) The author assures us that he was the first to attack this form of opportunism. But then how is one to reconcile this declaration with the author's next declaration: "The industrialisation of the country met with sym-

\* By the way, this is a direct distortion of Marx's letter to the effect that for the petty producer an abundant harvest is a still greater misfortune than a crop-failure. On this question Marx had in mind conditions of a development in the world and national market, which lead to conditions over which the petty producer has no control (over-production, decline and crisis) and naturally not those of a period of restriction of local markets.

† All quotations re-translated from the Russian.

pathy from Imperialism, which was applying itself to the extension of investment"? (p. 113.) How is one to qualify the following estimate of the policy pursued by British industrial capital in India, which is to be found on pp. 169-170? "Having conquered India, British merchant capital and the British aristocracy abolished the Indian system of production, lowered the standards of existence of the Indian masses and the purchasing power of the Indian population. When the capitalist manufacturers came to power in Britain they were compelled to improve matters so as to create an extensive market for their commodities in India. They implanted a new system of production in India, introduced education on Western lines, carried through social reforms, instituted democratic form of administration, industrialised agriculture, made railways, organised a modern banking system, and industry run by mechanical power. Such was the effect of the rule of British capitalism in India." Wouldn't the reader like a view of the Viceroy? Here you are! Lord Bentinck, for example. "In his zeal to defend the rights of the peasantry he caused indignation among the feudal land-owners with the result that he was replaced by a Council of Directors." (p. 59.) And here is another Viceroy: Dalhousie, whose administration was immediately followed by the 1857 revolt. In addition to the many good deeds which Mukherji authoritatively assures us he accomplished, but which we will not inflict upon our readers, "he alleviated the situation of the peasantry by lowering the land-taxes to twenty per cent. of the gross production. . . Dalhousie also gave the last blow to the disintegrating Indian feudalism, pursuing the policy of annexing Indian feudal States exceptionally vigorously." There is no doubt that Dalhousie exploited every permissible and impermissible occasion to transform the possibility of an indirect spoliation of the native States into a possibility of direct, more systematic and planned exploitation of the native population by British capital. But the fact that even at the present time one-third of the Indian people are still under the unlimited oppression of native despots is sufficiently convincing testimony to the policy of British imperialism, which was directed to the

conservation of the native States with a view to their exploitation against the forces of the revolution.

We shall not stop to consider the many errors which are scattered throughout the book, both general theoretical errors from the Marxist viewpoint and actual errors of fact in regard to Indian history. What, for instance, is one to make of the statement that "the industrial progress (of Britain) . . . depended on markets for the disposal of products and not *vice versa*, as certain present-day British economists attempt to prove." (p. 44.) For Mukherji's information, Marx was one of those "certain" economists who considered that industry creates its own markets, and if Comrade Mukherji were in the least a Marxist he would have been able to note this even in Indian history. Nor must one fail to recognise his extremely erroneous treatment of the terrorist trend which developed at the beginning of this century in India as though it were a counter-revolutionary trend (p. 146) even though it did preach the restoration of Indian monarchy. Lenin taught us to separate the subjective reactionary quality of populist ideas from their objectively revolutionary significance. The first Indian revolutionaries (Tilak and his followers) were reactionaries in so far as they dreamed of the return of Indian mediaevalism and the rule of the Brahmins; but objectively they reflected the struggle of the people towards emancipation from a foreign oppression, they were the first to begin the armed struggle against the British annexationists, and to this extent their movement was revolutionary. But when our author passes to the review of the post-war period and the present situation and comes to the conclusion that the "oppression of British capital is so great that willy-nilly the Indian bourgeoisie must seek support in the camp of the Indian and international proletariat" (p. 247) when he calls the bombast of the national bourgeoisie against the Simon Commission a "revolutionary position in regard to the British capitalist system" (p. 289) when we read of the Madras 1927 Congress resolution on independence that "this is of itself (of itself! B.F.) a great step in the direction of revolution" (p. 292) then, no matter what reserva-

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tions the author might make, it would be difficult to rid oneself of the impression that Comrade Mukherji was occupying a highly equivocal, and far from Communist position in regard to the treacherous Indian bourgeoisie. None the less, all these are details by comparison with the general impression which is left after reading the book as a whole.

In his introduction to this work, Comrade Magyar comments that "the exposition of the development of large-scale industry rather emphasises the constructive than the destructive rôle of British rule. (p. 5.) Surely Comrade Magyar was altogether too gentle in his estimate of the historical conception expounded in Comrade Mukherji's book? We know that Marx talked of Britain accomplishing a "social revolution" in India. But Marx also explained what social revolution he had in mind. Despite the renegade Roy (the one-time super-left Roy!) who considered that this meant a consummated bourgeois democratic revolution in India, despite Comrade Mukherji, who sees only the "objectively progressive" side of British colonial policy. Marx stated that the page of history of British rule in India hardly speaks of anything except a work of destruction: the constructive work of the British is hardly visible through the heaps of ruins. Also: "Britain is faced with the accomplishment of a dual mission in

India: a destructive and a constructive one; on the one hand the destruction of the old Asiatic society, and on the other the laying of the material foundation for the Western social system in Asia." Now that the Indian masses, under the leadership of the proletariat and its party, are rising for the struggle, in order to "reap the fruits of the new elements of society, sown among them by the British bourgeoisie" (Marx) it is a thousand times more necessary to show the Indian proletarian revolutionaries and the Indian workers what a bloody price (not only, nor even so much in gold or in human lives, as the populists or nationalists are accustomed to understand that price, but in a retardation in the rate of historical development, a price of backwardness, of primitiveness, of the preservation of the most repulsive Asiatic forms of exploitation and the most miserable mediæval social institutions) what price India has paid and is continuing to pay an imperialist State for the "blessings" of imperialist rule, rather than to transform Indian history into a bourgeois liberal apology for a colonial feudal régime. And it is that latter estimate which Comrade Mukherji's work has just earned, despite all the abundance of statistical material brought together in it, which the reader can use, albeit with great caution.



